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Abstract	  
	  
	   Though	   few	   are	   even	   aware	   of	   its	   existence,	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	  
exception	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment’s	  warrant	  requirement	  affects	  the	  lives	  of	  
nearly	   every	   American.	   Recent	   leaks	   of	   top-­‐secret	   National	   Security	  
Administration	   documents	   depict	   how	   the	   government	   has	   morphed	   the	  
exception	  into	  a	  massive	  catch	  all	  that	  allows	  intelligence	  agencies	  to	  perform	  
invasive	   searches	   without	   a	   warrant	   and	   in	   complete	   disregard	   of	   the	  
Constitution.	   The	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   began	   as	   a	   narrow	   tool	   to	  
shield	  sensitive	  national	  security	  investigations,	  but	  its	  application	  has	  reached	  
an	  alarming	  breadth.	  
	   This	  note	  explores	  the	  creation	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  
exception,	   tracing	   its	   history	   from	   George	   Washington’s	   secret	   surveillance	  
efforts	  during	  the	  Revolutionary	  War	  to	  the	  modern	  framework	  for	  warrantless	  
intelligence	  surveillance	  created	  by	  the	  Patriot	  Act.	  The	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  long	  
recognized	   the	   necessity	   of	   exceptions	   to	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment’s	   ordinarily	  
strict	   warrant	   and	   probable	   cause	   requirements.	   However,	   this	   history	  
illustrates	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception’s	   glaring	   disregard	   for	   the	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Indeed,	  I	  have	  little	  doubt	  that	  the	  author	  of	  our	  Constitution,	  James	  Madison,	  who	  
cautioned	  us	  to	  beware	  ‘the	  abridgement	  of	  freedom	  of	  the	  people	  by	  gradual	  and	  
silent	  encroachments	  by	  those	  in	  power,’	  would	  be	  aghast.1	  
-­‐	  The	  Honorable	  Richard	  J.	  Leon,	  on	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  NSA’s	  bulk	  data	  
collection	  
	  
I. INTRODUCTION	  	  
	  
	   On	  June	  6,	  2013,	  The	  Guardian	  newspaper	  published	  a	  series	  of	  
documents	   leaked	   by	   Edward	   Snowden,	   a	   contractor	   previously	  
employed	   by	   the	  National	   Security	   Agency	   (hereinafter	   “the	  NSA”).2	  
The	  documents	  detailed	  the	  NSA’s	  top-­‐secret	  massive	  data	  collection	  
program	   known	   as	   PRISM,	   which	   collected	   and	   stored	   the	   Internet	  
communications	   of	   millions	   of	   people	   worldwide.3	   In	   a	   response	   to	  
the	   uproar	   over	   the	   leaks,	   a	   senior	   government	   official	   cited	   the	  
Foreign	   Intelligence	   Surveillance	   Act	   (hereinafter	   “FISA”)	   as	   a	   solid	  
foundation	   for	   the	   NSA’s	   actions,	   and	   justified	   the	   programs	   by	  
referring	  to	  the	  repeated	  congressional	  and	  judicial	  approval	  of	  FISA’s	  
procedures	   for	   collecting	   and	   disseminating	   foreign	   intelligence	  
information.4	   As	   evidenced	   by	   the	   widespread	   acceptance	   of	  
heightened	   security	   and	   intelligence	   gathering	   after	   the	   terrorist	  
attacks	  of	   September	  11,	  2001,	  Americans	  have	   long	  been	  willing	   to	  
accept	  a	  tradeoff	  of	  increased	  security	  for	  diminished	  liberties	  in	  times	  
of	  crisis.5	  However,	  Snowden’s	  leaks	  lead	  to	  many	  concerns	  regarding	  
the	  constitutionality	  of	   the	  application	  of	  FISA	  and	  the	  government’s	  
now-­‐sweeping	   foreign	   intelligence	   collection	   programs,	   which	   only	  
continued	   to	   expand	   as	   the	   War	   on	   Terror	   deescalated	   in	   recent	  
years.	  
                                                
1	  Klayman	  v.	  Obama,	  957	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1,	  42	  (2013)	  (quoting	  James	  Madison,	  Speech	  
in	  the	  Virginia	  Ratifying	  Convention	  on	  Control	  of	  the	  Military	  (June	  16,	  1788),	  in	  THE	  
HISTORY	  OF	  THE	  VIRGINIA	  FEDERAL	  CONVENTION	  OF	  1788,	  WITH	  SOME	  ACCOUNT	  OF	  EMINENT	  
VIRGINIANS	  OF	  THAT	  ERA	  WHO	  WERE	  MEMBERS	  OF	  THE	  BODY	  (Vol.	  1)	  130).	  	  
2	  Glenn	  Greenwald	  &	  Ewen	  MacAskill,	  NSA	  PRISM	  Program	  Taps	  in	  to	  User	  Data	  of	  
Apple,	  Google	  and	  Others,	  THE	  GUARDIAN,	  June	  6,	  2013,	  
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-­‐tech-­‐giants-­‐nsa-­‐data.	  
3	  See	  Id.	  
4	  See	  Id.	  	  
5	  See	  generally	  Justin	  F.	  Kollar,	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act,	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  and	  
Paranoia:	  Can	  They	  Read	  This	  While	  I’m	  Typing?,	  3	  J.	  HIGH	  TECH.	  L.	  67,	  67	  at	  note	  3	  
(2004)	  (discussing	  the	  historical	  tradeoff	  between	  security	  and	  liberty	  in	  times	  of	  
“perceived	  peril”).	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   Snowden’s	   leaks	   shed	   new	   light	   on	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   NSA’s	  
surveillance	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  and	   ignited	  a	   fiery	  debate	  on	  
the	   limitations	   of	   the	   government’s	   national	   security	   powers.	   This	  
debate	   essentially	   centers	   around	   what	   has	   become	   known	   as	   the	  
“foreign	   intelligence	   exception,”	   which	   allows	   the	   government	   to	  
circumvent	  ordinary	  Fourth	  Amendment	  warrant	  and	  probable	  cause	  
requirements	   in	   certain	   situations	   involving	   concerns	   of	   national	  
security.	  Most	  Americans	  are	  blissfully	  unaware	  of	   the	  magnitude	  of	  
the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception	  and	  pondered	  how	  the	  government	  
had	   the	   authority	   for	   the	   expansive	   surveillance	   revealed	   by	  
Snowden’s	   leaks.	  While	  many	   reeled	   from	   the	   perceived	   affront	   on	  
their	  constitutional	  rights	  and	  lauded	  Snowden	  as	  a	  hero,	  many	  others	  
decried	  Snowden	  as	  a	  traitor	  and	  danger	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  United	  
States	   (hereinafter	   “the	   US”).6	   This	   wide	   range	   of	   reactions	   is	  
illustrative	   of	   the	   difficulty	   the	   US	   government	   has	   faced	   since	   its	  
inception,	   of	   properly	   balancing	   national	   security	   interests	   with	   the	  
privacy	  and	  liberty	  rights	  afforded	  by	  the	  Constitution.	  	  
	   This	  note	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  creation	  and	  expansion	  of	   the	  
foreign	  intelligence	  exception	  have	  significantly	  eroded	  the	  traditional	  
constitutional	  protections	  of	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  and	  do	   little	   to	  
realistically	  further	  the	  goal	  of	  fairly	  and	  justly	  balancing	  citizens’	  civil	  
liberties	  with	  the	  duties	  of	  law	  enforcement	  and	  interests	  of	  national	  
security	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.	   Part	   II	   sketches	   the	  
legal	   framework	   for	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception.	   A	   history	   of	  
Fourth	  Amendment	  search	  jurisprudence	  and	  the	  varied	  exceptions	  it	  
inspired	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception’s	  glaring	  
departure	   from	  the	  customarily	  narrow	  exceptions	  and	   the	  Supreme	  
Court’s	  (hereinafter	  “the	  Court”)	  prior	  definitions	  of	  which	  actions	  fell	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment’s	  warrant	  and	  probable	  
cause	   requirements.	  Part	   III	  details	   the	  development	  and	  application	  
of	   the	   exception	   up	   to	   the	   enactment	   of	   FISA.	   Parts	   IV	   and	   V,	  
respectively,	  analyze	  FISA	  and	  the	  Uniting	  and	  Strengthening	  America	  
by	   Providing	   Appropriate	   Tools	   to	   Intercept	   and	   Obstruct	   Terrorism	  
Act	   (hereinafter	   “the	   Patriot	   Act”)	   to	   determine	   the	   significance	   of	  
their	  impact	  on	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception.	  Part	  VI	  explores	  the	  
                                                
6	  See,	  e.g.,	  Post-­‐ABC	  Poll:	  NSA	  Surveillance	  and	  Edward	  Snowden,	  WASH.	  POST,	  July	  
24,	  2013,	  available	  at	  	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/polling/postabc-­‐
poll-­‐nsa-­‐surveillance-­‐edward-­‐snowden/2013/06/19/699571a8-­‐d8cf-­‐11e2-­‐b418-­‐
9dfa095e125d_page.html.	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potential	  for	  abuses	  of	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception	  and	  suggests	  
possible	  limitations	  that	  may	  help	  prevent	  such	  misuses.	  
	  
II. LEGAL	  FRAMEWORK	  FOR	  THE	  EXCEPTION	  
	  
	   Though	   many	   were	   shocked	   by	   Snowden’s	   revelations	   of	   the	  
NSA’s	  secret	  actions,	  there	  is	  in	  place	  a	  legal	  framework	  within	  which	  
the	  NSA’s	   programs	   have	   developed.	   This	   note	   argues	   that	   the	  NSA	  
and	   applications	   of	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   exceeded	   the	  
boundaries	  of	  that	  framework,	  and	  this	  section	  discusses	  the	  structure	  
of	  the	  laws	  and	  precedents	  on	  which	  the	  NSA	  alleges	  PRISM	  and	  other	  
such	  programs	  are	  based.	  
	   The	   collection	   of	   intelligence	   information,	   generally	   through	  
electronic	   surveillance	   and	  wiretapping,	   has	   long	   been	   considered	   a	  
search	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment,	   and	   is	  
therefore,	   in	   theory,	   governed	   by	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   Fourth	  
Amendment.7	   Fourth	   Amendment	   protections	   are	   nebulous	   and	  
adaptive.	   As	   technology,	   conflict,	   and	   security	   have	   evolved,	   so	   too	  
have	   interpretations	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.	   The	   foreign	  
intelligence	   exception,	   certainly	   not	   contemplated	   by	   the	   Founding	  
Fathers,	   has	   developed	   within	   this	   framework	   of	   fluid	   and	   shifting	  
Fourth	  Amendment	  analysis.	  	  
	  
A. Development	  of	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  	  
	  
i. Fourth	  Amendment	  Protections	  in	  General	  
	  
	   In	   light	   of	   the	   tyrannies	   experienced	   at	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   oft-­‐
abused	  general	  warrants	  exercised	  by	   their	  British	  colonial	  overlords,	  
the	  Founding	  Fathers	  viewed	  unwarranted	  intrusions	  into	  private	  lives	  
and	   homes	   to	   be	   a	   chief	   evil	   against	   which	   the	   Constitution	   should	  
offer	  citizens	  protections.8	  The	  drafters	  of	  the	  Constitution	  crafted	  the	  
                                                
7	  In	  Katz,	  the	  Court	  conceded	  that	  “the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  protects	  people	  and	  not	  
simply	  ‘areas’.”	  Therefore	  a	  search	  analysis	  turns	  on	  a	  defendant’s	  reasonable	  
expectation	  of	  privacy	  rather	  than	  his	  location.	  This	  assertion	  also	  means	  that	  the	  
Fourth	  Amendment	  extends	  to	  the	  recording	  of	  oral	  and	  written	  statements,	  the	  
action	  most	  often	  involved	  in	  intelligence	  collecting.	  See	  Katz	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  
U.S.	  347,	  353	  (1967).	  	  	  
8	  See,	  e.g.,	  Boyd	  v.	  United	  States,	  116	  U.S.	  616,	  625-­‐628	  (1886)	  (discussing	  the	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Fourth	  Amendment	  to	  ensure	  that	  Americans	  could	  not	  be	  subjected	  
to	  such	  tyranny.9	  Since	  its	  inception,	  two	  distinct	  clauses	  of	  the	  Fourth	  
Amendment	   have	   shaped	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	   protection	   it	  
affords.	  
	  
a. The	  Search	  and	  Seizure10	  Clause	  and	  the	  	  	  
Requirement	  of	  Reasonableness	  
	  
	   The	   text	  of	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  provides	   little	  guidance	   for	  
defining	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  “searches,”	  and	  the	  Court	  has	  gone	  through	  
several	  distinct	  phases	  of	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term.	  In	  the	  embryonic	  
years	  of	  the	  US,	  “the	  need	  for	  protections	  against	  search	  and	  seizure	  
was	  articulated	  in	  the	  context	  of	  physical	  entry	  into	  the	  home.”11	  The	  
Court	   gradually	   moved	   from	   this	   property	   rights	   analysis	   to	   a	   test	  
focusing	   on	   the	   defendant’s	   expectation	   of	   privacy.	   This	   test	   was	  
solidified	   by	   the	   1967	   Katz	   decision,	   in	   which	   Justice	   Harlan’s	  
concurrence	   laid	   out	   the	   rule	   used	   for	   the	   next	   several	   decades:	  
“there	  is	  a	  twofold	  requirement,	  first	  that	  a	  person	  have	  exhibited	  an	  
actual	   (subjective)	   expectation	   of	   privacy	   and,	   second,	   that	   the	  
expectation	   be	   one	   that	   society	   is	   prepared	   to	   recognize	   as	  
‘reasonable’.”12	   From	  Katz	  onward,	   reasonableness	   formed	   the	  basis	  
of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  search	  analyses.	  	  
	   In	  light	  of	  the	  infinite	  number	  of	  situations	  from	  which	  a	  Fourth	  
Amendment	   case	   may	   arise,	   the	   Court	   recognized	   the	   need	   for	   a	  
flexible	   standard	   of	   reasonableness.	   Accordingly,	   the	   Court	   in	  Harris	  
explained,	  “[t]he	  test	  of	  reasonableness	  cannot	  be	  stated	  in	  rigid	  and	  
                                                                                                                
history	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment).	  
9	  The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  reads:	  “The	  right	  of	  the	  people	  to	  be	  secure	  in	  their	  
persons,	  houses,	  papers,	  and	  effects,	  against	  unreasonable	  searches	  and	  seizures,	  
shall	  not	  be	  violated,	  and	  no	  Warrants	  shall	  issue,	  but	  upon	  probable	  cause,	  
supported	  by	  Oath	  or	  affirmation,	  and	  particularly	  describing	  the	  place	  to	  be	  
searched,	  and	  the	  persons	  or	  things	  to	  be	  seized.”	  U.S.	  Const.,	  amend.	  IV.	  
10	  Though	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  protects	  against	  both	  searches	  and	  seizures,	  this	  
note	  will	  focus	  only	  on	  searches,	  as	  foreign	  intelligence	  collection	  is	  rarely	  
considered	  a	  seizure.	  
11	  Orin	  S.	  Kerr,	  The	  Curious	  History	  of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  Searches,	  SUP.	  CT.	  REV.,	  
2012	  (forthcoming	  Sept.	  2012)	  (manuscript	  at	  7),	  available	  at	  	  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2154611	  (explaining	  that	  the	  Court’s	  early	  Fourth	  
Amendment	  analysis	  often	  centered	  around	  physical	  trespass).	  
12	  Katz,	  389	  U.S.	  at	  361	  (Harlan,	  J.,	  concurring).	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absolute	   terms.	   ‘Each	   case	   is	   to	   be	   decided	   on	   its	   own	   facts	   and	  
circumstances.’”13	  This	  fact-­‐intensive	  approach	  ensures	  a	  fair	  analysis	  
of	  the	  specific	  facts	  of	  each	  case	  rather	  than	  application	  of	  a	  general	  
rule	  more	  easily	  subject	  to	  abuses	  because	  of	  its	  generality.	  While	  the	  
determination	  of	  reasonableness	  encompasses	  numerous	  factors,	  the	  
Court	   has	   emphasized	   the	   context,	   which	   includes	   the	   defendant’s	  
expectation	   of	   privacy,	   and	   the	   intrusiveness	   of	   the	   search	   as	   the	  
lynchpins	  of	  the	  analysis.14	  
	  
b. The	  Warrant	  Clause	  and	  the	  Requirement	  of	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  Probable	  Cause	  
	  
	   Intrinsically	   tied	   to	   the	   requirement	   of	   reasonableness	   is	   the	  
necessity	   of	   a	   warrant.	   A	   search	   conducted	   without	   prior	   judicial	  
approval	   (via	  a	  warrant)	   is	  considered	  presumptively	  unreasonable.15	  
This	   insertion	   of	   a	   neutral	   and	   detached	   magistrate	   between	   the	  
suspect	   and	   law	   enforcement	   is	   a	   safeguard	  mandated	   by	   both	   the	  
language	   and	   purpose	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   and	   ensures	   that	  
constitutional	   protections	   are	   not	   tainted	   by	   overzealous	   police	  
investigation.16	  	  
	   The	   unbiased	   magistrate	   is	   tasked	   with	   determining	   whether	  
                                                
13	  Harris	  v.	  United	  States,	  331	  U.S.	  145,	  150	  (1947)	  (citing	  Go-­‐Bart	  Importing	  
Company	  v.	  United	  States,	  282	  U.S.	  344,	  357	  (1931)).	  
14	  For	  example,	  the	  Court’s	  decisions	  examining	  whether	  a	  dog	  sniff	  constituted	  a	  
Fourth	  Amendment	  search	  highlight	  the	  focus	  on	  intrusiveness.	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  
States	  v.	  Place,	  462	  U.S.	  696,	  706-­‐707	  (1983)	  (emphasizing	  the	  fact	  that	  luggage	  
sniffed	  by	  the	  dog	  remains	  closed,	  which	  “ensures	  that	  the	  owner	  of	  the	  property	  is	  
not	  subjected	  to	  the	  embarrassment	  and	  inconvenience	  entailed	  in	  less	  discriminate	  
and	  more	  intrusive	  investigative	  methods.”);	  City	  of	  Indianapolis	  v.	  Edmond,	  531	  
U.S.	  32,	  40	  (2000)	  (highlighting	  the	  facts	  that	  a	  dog	  sniff	  “does	  not	  require	  entry	  into	  
the	  car	  and	  is	  not	  designed	  to	  disclose	  any	  information	  other	  than	  the	  presence	  or	  
absence	  of	  narcotics.”).	  	  
15	  See	  Katz,	  389	  U.S.	  at	  357	  (citing	  Jones	  v.	  United	  States,	  357	  U.S.	  493,	  497-­‐499	  
(1958);	  Rios	  v.	  United	  States,	  364	  U.S.	  253,	  261	  (1960);	  Chapman	  v.	  United	  States,	  
365	  U.S.	  610,	  613-­‐615	  (1961);	  Stoner	  v.	  California,	  376	  U.S.	  483,	  486-­‐487(1964)).	  	  
16	  See	  McDonald	  v.	  United	  States,	  335	  U.S.	  451,	  455	  (1948).	  See	  also	  Terry	  v.	  Ohio,	  
392	  U.S.	  1,	  21	  (1968)	  (“The	  scheme	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  becomes	  meaningful	  
only	  when	  it	  is	  assured	  that	  at	  some	  point	  the	  conduct	  of	  those	  charged	  with	  
enforcing	  the	  laws	  can	  be	  subjected	  to	  the	  more	  detached,	  neutral	  scrutiny	  of	  a	  
judge	  who	  must	  evaluate	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  a	  particular	  search	  or	  seizure	  in	  light	  
of	  the	  particular	  circumstances.”).	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sufficient	   probable	   cause	   exists	   to	   issue	   a	   warrant.	   Like	  
reasonableness,	   probable	   cause	   is	   a	   fluid	   concept	   that	   takes	   into	  
account	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  each	  individual	  case	  so	  as	  
to	   allow	   law	   enforcement	   sufficient	   room	   to	   conduct	   an	  
investigation.17	   In	   general,	   “‘[t]he	   substance	   of	   all	   the	   definitions	   of	  
probable	   cause	   is	   a	   reasonable	   ground	   for	   belief	   of	   guilt,’	   and	   that	  
belief	  of	  guilt	  must	  be	  particularized	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  person	  to	  be	  
searched	  or	  seized.”18	  However,	   the	   requirements	  of	  probable	  cause	  
and	  a	  warrant	  are	  occasionally	  relaxed	  and	  are	  not	  the	  sole	  means	  of	  
legitimizing	  a	  search	  as	  reasonable.19	  
	  
ii. The	  Court	  Recognizes	  Exceptions	  
	  
	   Nearly	  as	  old	  as	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  itself	  are	  the	  exceptions	  
to	   its	   warrant	   requirement.	   Because	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
denounces	   only	   “unreasonable”	   searches,	   a	   search	   that	   meets	   the	  
reasonableness	   requirement	   even	   though	   it	   may	   lack	   a	   warrant	   is	  
constitutionally	   permissible	   as	   an	   exception	   to	   the	   general	  
requirement	  of	  a	  warrant.	  As	   Justice	  Stewart	  announced	   in	  Katz,	   the	  
warrant	  requirement	  is	  “subject	  only	  to	  a	  few	  specifically	  established	  
and	   well-­‐delineated	   exceptions.”20	   However,	   as	   Fourth	   Amendment	  
jurisprudence	   has	   developed,	   it	   is	   not	   entirely	   clear	   that	   these	  
exceptions	   truly	   are	   as	   “well-­‐delineated”	   as	   Justice	   Stewart	  
proclaimed.21	  
	   Though	  their	  boundaries	  may	  be	  ambiguous,	   the	  exceptions	   to	  
the	  warrant	   requirement	   can	   be	   classified	   into	   four	   distinct	   types.22	  
                                                
17	  See	  Maryland	  v.	  Pringle,	  540	  U.S.	  366,	  370	  (2003).	  
18	  Id.	  at	  371	  (citing	  Brinegar	  v.	  United	  States,	  338	  U.S.	  160,	  175	  (1949);	  Ybarra	  v.	  
Illinois,	  444	  U.S.	  85,	  91,	  (1979)).	  
19	  See,	  e.g.,	  Coolidge	  v.	  New	  Hampshire,	  403	  U.S.	  443,	  455	  (1971).	  	  
20	  Katz	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  347,	  357	  (1967).	  
21	  See	  Craig	  M.	  Bradley,	  Two	  Models	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  83	  MICH.	  L.	  REV.	  
1468,	  1473	  (1985)	  (“In	  fact,	  these	  exceptions	  are	  neither	  few	  nor	  well-­‐delineated.	  
There	  are	  over	  twenty	  exceptions	  to	  the	  probable	  cause	  or	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  
or	  both.”).	  
22	  “(1)	  exceptions	  based	  on	  a	  perception	  that	  exigent	  circumstances	  make	  obtaining	  
a	  warrant	  impossible	  or	  impractical;	  (2)	  exceptions	  resting	  on	  a	  finding	  that	  the	  
police	  action	  does	  not	  impinge	  upon	  a	  substantial	  privacy	  interest;	  (3)	  "special	  
needs"	  situations	  where	  warrants	  might	  frustrate	  legitimate	  purposes	  of	  the	  
government	  other	  than	  crime	  control;	  and	  (4)	  situations	  where	  magistrates	  are	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The	  category	  of	  exceptions	  most	  analogous	  to	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  
exception	   is	   likely	   the	   “special	   needs”	   exception,	   which	   allows	   law	  
enforcement	   to	   relax	   both	   the	   probable	   cause	   and	   warrant	  
requirements	   in	   situations	   where	   such	   strictures	   would	   frustrate	  
important	  goals	  not	  related	  to	  law	  enforcement	  (i.e.	  national	  security	  
goals	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception).23	   First	  
enunciated	   in	   the	   1985	   decision	   N.J.	   v.	   T.L.O.,	   24	   which	   upheld	   the	  
warrantless	  search	  of	  a	  student’s	  purse	  in	  a	  public	  school,	  the	  special	  
needs	   exception	   has	   since	   been	   applied	   to	   a	   number	   of	   varying	  
circumstances.	   For	   example,	   the	   Court	   used	   the	   special	   needs	  
exception	  to	  justify	  the	  warrantless	  drug	  testing	  of	  customs	  officials,25	  
railway	  workers,26	  and	  student	  athletes.27	  Though	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  a	  
far	   stretch	   from	   special	   needs	   cases	   to	   foreign	   intelligence	   cases,	   in	  
which	  national	   security	   is	   arguably	   an	   incredibly	   compelling	   non-­‐law	  
enforcement	   goal,	   the	   Court	   has	   emphasized	   that	   the	   special	   needs	  
decisions	   rested	   on	   the	   administrative	   nature	   of	   the	   searches	   in	  
question,	   which	   lessens	   the	   intrusion	   involved.28	   Accordingly,	   the	  
                                                                                                                
considered	  unnecessary	  because	  other	  devices	  already	  curb	  police	  discretion.”	  
Christopher	  Slobogin,	  The	  World	  Without	  a	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  39	  UCLA	  L.	  REV.	  1,	  
18-­‐19	  (1991).	  
23	  See	  generally	  United	  States	  v.	  Kincade,	  379	  F.3d	  813,	  821	  (2004)	  (describing	  cases	  
in	  which	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  applied	  the	  special	  needs	  exception).	  
24	  N.J.	  v.	  T.L.O.,	  469	  U.S.	  325,	  333	  (1985).	  Though	  the	  majority	  did	  not	  expressly	  
create	  a	  special	  needs	  exception	  in	  its	  opinion,	  Justice	  Blackmun	  clarified	  the	  
majority’s	  balancing	  test	  analysis	  in	  his	  concurrence	  by	  saying	  that	  “[o]nly	  in	  those	  
exceptional	  circumstances	  in	  which	  special	  needs,	  beyond	  the	  normal	  need	  for	  law	  
enforcement,	  make	  the	  warrant	  and	  probable-­‐cause	  requirement	  impracticable,	  is	  a	  
court	  entitled	  to	  substitute	  its	  balancing	  of	  interests	  for	  that	  of	  the	  Framers.”	  T.L.O.,	  
469	  U.S.	  at	  351	  (Blackmun,	  J.,	  concurring)	  (emphasis	  added).	  
25	  National	  Treasury	  Employees	  Union	  v.	  Von	  Raab,	  489	  U.S.	  656,	  666	  (1989).	  
26	  Skinner	  v.	  Railway	  Labor	  Executives'	  Ass'n,	  489	  U.S.	  602,	  620	  (1989)	  ("The	  
Government's	  interest	  in	  regulating	  the	  conduct	  of	  railroad	  employees	  to	  ensure	  
safety	  .	  .	  .	  'presents	  "special	  needs"	  beyond	  normal	  law	  enforcement	  that	  may	  
justify	  departures	  from	  the	  usual	  warrant	  and	  probable-­‐cause	  requirements.’”	  
(quoting	  Griffin	  v.	  Wisconsin,	  483	  U.S.	  868,	  873-­‐74	  (1987)).	  
27	  Vernonia	  Sch.	  Dist	  47J	  v.	  Acton,	  515	  U.S.	  646,	  653	  (1995)	  (“[S]uch	  "special	  
needs"…	  exist	  in	  the	  public	  school	  context.	  There,	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  ‘would	  
unduly	  interfere	  with	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  swift	  and	  informal	  disciplinary	  
procedures….’”	  (citing	  T.L.O.,	  469	  U.S.	  at	  340)).	  
28	  See	  Slobogin,	  supra	  note	  22,	  at	  26	  (“The	  fact	  that	  the	  government	  investigators	  in	  
these	  special	  needs	  situations	  typically	  are	  looking	  for	  proof	  of	  something	  other	  
than	  crime,	  or	  at	  least	  evidence	  of	  something	  other	  than	  serious	  crime,	  is	  used	  by	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Court	   declined	   to	   extend	   the	   exception	   to	   uphold	   random	   police	  
checkpoints	  aimed	  generally	  at	  interdicting	  illegal	  drugs	  because	  such	  
checkpoints’	   “primary	   purpose	   was	   to	   detect	   evidence	   of	   ordinary	  
criminal	  wrongdoing,”	  a	  law	  enforcement	  goal	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  protection	  
under	  the	  special	  needs	  exception.29	  
	   Special	  needs	  and	  other	  such	  exceptions	  help	  the	  Court	  balance	  
the	  privacy	  interest	  of	  individuals	  against	  the	  concern	  that	  beefing	  up	  
the	   warrant	   requirement	   may	   unduly	   hamper	   the	   job	   of	   law	  
enforcement.	  This	  reasoning,	  on	  which	  most	  exceptions	  (including	  the	  
foreign	   intelligence	   exception)	   rest,	   has	   led	   the	   Court	   to	   develop	   a	  
balancing	  test	  to	  be	  used	  to	  determine	  whether	  an	  exception	  applies.	  
This	  balancing	  requires	  the	  Court	  the	  weigh	  the	  government’s	  interest	  
(generally	   expressed	   as	   the	   need	   for	   effective	   and	   efficient	   law	  
enforcement	  30)	  against	   the	   individual’s	  constitutional	   rights.31	  When	  
crafting	   an	   exception,	   the	   Court	   continually	   emphasizes	   that	   each	  
exception	   is	   meant	   to	   be	   construed	   as	   narrowly	   as	   possible.32	  
However,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  
begs	  for	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  question:	  Is	  the	  requirement	  for	  a	  warrant	  
truly	   implicit	   in	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  or	   is	   there	   simply	  a	  general	  






                                                                                                                
the	  Court	  to	  minimize	  the	  individual	  interests	  involved	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
bolster	  the	  government	  interest	  in	  dispensing	  with	  a	  warrant.”).	  
29	  City	  of	  Indianapolis	  v.	  Edmond,	  531	  U.S.	  32,	  35	  (2000).	  	  
30	  In	  arguing	  for	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement,	  the	  government	  often	  
contends	  that	  in	  certain	  situations	  the	  strictures	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  impede	  
effective	  law	  enforcement.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Johnson	  v.	  United	  States,	  333	  U.S.	  10,	  15	  
(1948).	  In	  a	  dissent,	  Justice	  Frankfurter	  argued	  that	  these	  claims	  were	  grossly	  
exaggerated	  by	  the	  government	  and	  only	  in	  rare	  cases	  merited	  an	  exception.	  See	  
Harris	  v.	  United	  States,	  331	  U.S.	  145,	  171	  (1947)	  (Frankfurter,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  
31	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Villamonte-­‐Marquez,	  462	  U.S.	  579,	  588	  (1983).	  
32	  See,	  e.g.	  Thompson	  v.	  Louisiana,	  469	  U.S.	  17,	  21	  (1984);	  Coolidge	  v.	  New	  
Hampshire,	  403	  U.S.	  443,	  455	  (1971)	  (explaining	  that	  exceptions	  to	  the	  warrant	  
requirement	  are	  ‘jealously	  and	  carefully	  drawn’…	  (quoting	  Jones	  v.	  United	  States,	  
357	  U.S.	  493,	  499	  (1958)));	  McDonald	  v.	  United	  States,	  335	  U.S.	  451,	  454	  (1948)	  (“A	  
search	  without	  a	  warrant	  demands	  exceptional	  circumstances…”)	  (emphasis	  added).	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B. The	  Executive’s	  National	  Security	  Powers	  
	  
	   The	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   cannot	   be	   looked	   at	   in	   the	  
isolated	   context	   of	   Fourth	   Amendment	   exceptions.	  When	   dissecting	  
the	  development	  of	  the	  foreign	   intelligence	  exception,	  an	  analysis	  of	  
the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Executive’s	   national	   security	   powers	   is	   equally	  
important.	   Together,	   these	   two	   foundations	   have	   created	   the	   legal	  
framework	   within	   which	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   has	  
flourished.	  	  
	  
i. Constitutional	  National	  Security	  Powers	  
	  
	   Article	  II,	  section	  2	  of	  the	  Constitution	  grants	  the	  Executive	  the	  
well-­‐known	   Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	   power	   over	   the	   country’s	   armed	  
forces.	  This,	   combined	  with	   the	  President’s	  authority	   to	  appoint	  and	  
receive	   foreign	   officials,	   has	   long	   been	   understood	   as	   making	   the	  
Executive	  the	  gatekeeper	  of	  national	  security	  and	  foreign	  relations.33	  
The	  Court	  has	  recognized	  that	  the	  President	  “is	  the	  sole	  organ	  of	  the	  
nation	  in	  its	  external	  relations,	  and	  its	  sole	  representative	  with	  foreign	  
nations.”34	   Traditionally,	   the	   Executive	   has	   been	   afforded	   wide	  
latitude	   to	   conduct	   the	   nation’s	   foreign	   affairs.	   This	   has	   often	   come	  
into	   conflict	   with	   other	   constitutional	   provisions	   and	   has	   led	   to	   the	  
question	  of	  whether	  the	  Executive	  can	  effectively	  perform	  its	  national	  
security	   duties	   within	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.	   The	  
foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   endeavors	   to	   address	   this	   problem	  by	  
granting	   the	   Executive	   sufficient	   flexibility	   to	   deal	   with	   foreign	  
intelligence	  without	  the	  ordinary	  barriers	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	  
	  
ii. Judicial	  Interpretations	  
	  
	   The	   murkiness	   of	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   Executive’s	   national	  
security	  power	  is	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  the	  customary	  deference	  of	  the	  
judiciary	   in	   all	   matters	   of	   national	   security.35	   Courts	   have	   widely	  
                                                
33	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Curtiss-­‐Wright	  Export	  Corp.,	  209	  U.S.	  304,	  319	  (1936).	  
34	  Id.	  	  
35	  In	  describing	  this	  traditional	  deference	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  
Appeals	  for	  the	  Second	  Circuit	  said,	  “the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  stated	  in	  no	  uncertain	  
terms	  that	  ‘[i]t	  is	  “obvious	  and	  unarguable”	  that	  no	  governmental	  interest	  is	  more	  
compelling	  than	  the	  security	  of	  the	  Nation.’”	  United	  States	  v.	  Ghailani,	  2013	  U.S.	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embraced	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Executive	  is	  the	  preeminent	  authority	  
in	  the	  area	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  has	  much	  greater	  expertise	  in	  such	  
matters,	   so	   his	   decisions	   should	   not	   be	   questioned	   or	   even	  
scrutinized.36	   Even	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   is	   hesitant	   to	  define	  or	   even	  
address	  the	  Executive’s	  national	  security	  powers,	  often	  declaring	  the	  
issue	   to	   be	   a	   non-­‐justiciable	   political	   question	   that	   cannot	   be	  
resolved	  by	  the	  Court.	  
	   In	   a	   rare	   case	   in	   which	   the	   Court	   even	   mentioned	   national	  
security,	   it	   hinted	   that	   national	   security	   would	   be	   a	   sufficient	  
justification	  that	  could	  shield	  executive	  actions	  from	  oversight	  by	  the	  
courts.37	  During	  the	  Watergate	  scandal,	  President	  Nixon	  was	  served	  a	  
subpoena	   requesting	   that	   he	   divulge	   tape	   recordings	   made	   in	   the	  
White	   House.38	   Citing	   executive	   privilege,	   a	   rare	   defense	   used	   to	  
guard	   the	   secrecy	   of	   presidential	   communications,	   and	   the	  
traditional	  deference	  of	  the	  judiciary	  to	  the	  executive,	  Nixon	  refused	  
to	  comply	  with	  the	  subpoena.39	  In	  their	  rejection	  of	  Nixon’s	  claim	  of	  
privilege,	   the	   Court	   declared	   that,	   “[a]bsent	   a	   claim	   of	   need	   to	  
protect	  military,	  diplomatic,	  or	  sensitive	  national	  security	  secrets,	  we	  
find	   it	   difficult	   to	   accept	   [Nixon’s]	   argument….”40	   Later	   lower	   court	  
decisions	  attempted	  to	  qualify	   this	  suggestion	  that	  national	  security	  
concerns	  were	  an	  absolute	  shield	  for	  executive	  action	  by	  announcing	  
some	  minimal	  restrictions,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  States	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  
D.C.	   Circuit’s	   assertion	   that	   “courts	   may	   not	   simply	   accept	   bland	  
assurances	  by	  the	  Executive	  that	  a	  situation	  did,	   in	  fact,	  represent	  a	  
national	   security	   problem	   requiring	   electronic	   surveillance.”41	  
However,	   no	   court	   has	   created	   any	   bright-­‐line	   rule	   regarding	   the	  




                                                                                                                
App.	  LEXIS	  21597	  at	  37	  (2103)	  (citing	  Haig	  v.	  Agee,	  453	  U.S.	  280,	  307	  (1981)	  (quoting	  
Aptheker	  v.	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  378	  U.S.	  500,	  509	  (1964)).	  
36	  See	  Ghailani,	  2013	  U.S.	  App.	  LEXIS	  21597	  at	  37.	  	  
37	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Nixon,	  418	  U.S.	  683,	  686	  (1974).	  
38	  Id.	  	  
39	  Id.	  	  
40	  Id.	  at	  706	  
41	  Smith	  v.	  Nixon,	  606	  F.2d	  1183,	  1188	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1979).	  However,	  the	  D.C.	  Circuit	  did	  
not	  provide	  any	  suggestion	  as	  to	  how	  or	  to	  what	  degree	  the	  Executive’s	  assertions	  
should	  be	  corroborated.	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iii. The	  Fourth	  Amendment	  in	  Matters	  of	  National	  Security	  
	  
	   In	  light	  of	  this	  judicial	  deference,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  scope	  
of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  protections	  in	  the	  context	  of	  national	  security	  
is	   equally	  unclear.	   The	  executive	  branch	  has	   continually	   engaged	   in	  
activities	   such	   as	   surveillance	   and	   wiretapping,	   which	   implicate	  
Fourth	   Amendment	   protections,	   in	   the	   name	   of	   national	   security	  
with	  impunity.	  
	  
a. History	  of	  Executive	  Wiretapping	  
	  
	   In	  a	  2006	  memorandum	  describing	  the	  legal	  foundations	  for	  the	  
NSA’s	   extensive	   intelligence	   collection	   programs,	   the	  Department	   of	  
Justice	   (hereinafter	  “the	  DOJ”)	   traced	   the	  history	  of	  Executive	  secret	  
intelligence	   gathering	   all	   the	   way	   back	   to	   George	   Washington,	  
explaining	  that	  nearly	  every	  president	  since	  the	  very	  first	  has	  engaged	  
in	   such	   activity.42	   Falling	   naturally	   in	   line	   with	   this	   storied	   history,	  
“[e]lectronic	   surveillance	   –	   the	   interception	   of	   communications	   as	  
they	   travel	   on	   a	   wire	   –	   began	   shortly	   after	   the	   development	   of	  
electronic	   communications.”43	   Electronic	   surveillance	   by	   the	  
government	   has	   grown,	   largely	   unimpeded,	   since	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	  
technology	  that	  allows	  it.	  
	  
b. Executive	  Authority	  for	  Wiretapping	  &	  Judicial	  
Regulation	  	  
	  
	   The	   power	   to	   conduct	   secret	   surveillance	   and	   intelligence	  
collection	   has	   long	   thought	   to	   be	   implicit	   in	   the	   Executive’s	  
constitutional	   duty	   to	   defend	   and	   protect	   the	   nation.	   The	   Court	  
endorsed	   this	   notion	   on	   several	   occasions.44	   Even	   though	   Katz	  
                                                
42	  See	  U.S.	  Dep’t	  of	  Justice,	  Legal	  Authorities	  Supporting	  the	  Activities	  of	  the	  
National	  Security	  Agency	  Described	  by	  the	  President,	  at	  15	  (January	  19,	  2006)	  
(hereinafter	  “DOJ	  memo”),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB178/surv39.pdf.	  
43	  Matthew	  A.	  Anzaldi	  &	  Jonathan	  W.	  Gannon,	  In	  re	  Directives	  Pursuant	  to	  Section	  
105B	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  Act:	  Judicial	  Recognition	  of	  Certain	  
Warrantless	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Surveillance,	  88	  TEX.	  L.	  REV.	  1599,	  1602	  (2010).	  
44	  See	  DOJ	  memo,	  supra,	  note	  42	  (“In	  accordance	  with	  these	  well-­‐established	  
principles,	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  has	  consistently	  recognized	  the	  President’s	  authority	  
to	  conduct	  intelligence	  activities.	  See,	  e.g.,	  Totten	  v.	  United	  States,	  92	  U.S.	  105,	  106	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reversed	   the	  holding	   from	  Olmstead	   that	  electronic	   surveillance	  did	  
not	  raise	  Fourth	  Amendment	  concerns,45	  the	  government	  continued	  
to	  operate	  under	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  Executive	  had	   implied	  authority	  
for	   such	   actions	   and	   was	   therefore	   not	   subject	   to	   the	   ordinary	  
strictures	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment’s	   warrant	   and	   probable	   cause	  
requirements	   in	  matters	   implicating	   national	   security.	   This	   position	  
was	  not	  completely	  without	  support,	  though.	  	  
	   The	   majority	   in	   Katz	  made	   clear	   that	   it	   did	   not	   intend	   for	   its	  
holding	   to	   resolve	   the	  question	  of	   the	  scope	  of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  
protections	   in	   cases	   of	   national	   security,46	   and	   Justice	   White’s	  
concurring	   opinion	   urged	   the	   Court	   to	   exempt	   wiretapping	   for	  
national	   security	   purposes	   from	   the	   warrant	   requirement.47	   The	  
Court	  left	  considerable	  room	  for	  the	  Executive	  to	  flex	  its	  intelligence	  
collecting	  muscle,	  and	  it	  did	  so	  with	  great	  veracity	  and	  little	  oversight	  
or	  regulation.48	  Because	  of	  the	  wide	  holes	   left	  open	  by	  the	  few	  and	  
limited	  Supreme	  Court	  cases	  on	  the	  issue,	  no	  court	  before	  FISA	  held	  
that	  wiretapping	  ordered	  by	  the	  Executive	  and	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  
of	  national	  security	  violated	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.49	  
                                                                                                                
(1876)	  (recognizing	  President’s	  authority	  to	  hire	  spies);	  Tenet	  v.	  Doe,	  544	  U.S.	  1	  
(2005)	  (reaffirming	  Totten	  and	  counseling	  against	  judicial	  interference	  with	  such	  
matters);	  See	  also	  Chicago	  &	  S.	  Air	  Lines	  v.	  Waterman	  S.S.	  Corp.,	  333	  U.S.	  103,	  111	  
(1948)	  (“The	  President,	  both	  as	  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief	  and	  as	  the	  Nation’s	  organ	  for	  
foreign	  affairs,	  has	  available	  intelligence	  services	  whose	  reports	  neither	  are	  not	  and	  
ought	  not	  to	  be	  published	  to	  the	  world.”);	  United	  States	  v.	  Curtiss-­‐Wright	  Export	  
Corp.,	  299	  U.S.	  304,	  320	  (1936))”).	  
45	  See	  Katz	  v.	  United	  States,	  389	  U.S.	  347,	  353	  (1967);	  Olmstead	  v.	  United	  States,	  277	  
U.S.	  438,	  466	  (1928).	  
46	  Katz,	  389	  U.S.	  at	  358	  (“Whether	  safeguards	  other	  than	  prior	  authorization	  by	  a	  
magistrate	  would	  satisfy	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  in	  a	  situation	  involving	  national	  
security	  is	  a	  question	  not	  presented	  by	  this	  case.”).	  
47	  Id.	  at	  363	  (White,	  J.,	  concurring).	  
48	  Section	  IV.	  A.,	  infra,	  will	  discuss	  the	  government’s	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  lax	  
regulations	  and	  the	  abuses	  that	  became	  the	  impetus	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  FISA.	  
49	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Ehrlichman,	  546	  F2d	  910,	  924	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1976),	  cert	  den.,	  
429	  U.S.	  1120	  (“Since	  1940	  the	  "foreign	  affairs"	  exception	  to	  the	  prohibition	  against	  
wiretapping	  has	  been	  espoused	  by	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  as	  a	  necessary	  concomitant	  
to	  the	  President's	  constitutional	  power	  over	  the	  exercise	  of	  this	  country's	  foreign	  
affairs,	  and	  warrantless	  electronic	  surveillance	  has	  been	  upheld	  by	  lower	  federal	  
courts	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions.”);	  But	  see	  Halperin	  v.	  Kissinger,	  606,	  F.2d	  1192,	  
1201	  (D.C.	  Cir.	  1979)	  (restricting	  the	  national	  security	  powers	  of	  the	  Executive	  by	  
declaring	  that	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  may	  be	  exercised	  “must	  be	  limited	  to	  
instances	  of	  immediate	  and	  grave	  peril	  to	  the	  nation”).	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c. A	  National	  Security	  Exception?	  
	  
	   	  Despite	  the	  seeming	  total	  deference	  to	  the	  Executive	  in	  matters	  
labeled	  as	  national	  security,	  before	  FISA,	  there	  was	  no	  consensus	  on	  
the	   issue	   of	   whether	   a	   general	   and	   absolute	   national	   security	  
exception	  to	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  existed.	  However,	  most	  courts	  
agreed	   that	   national	   security	   is	   a	   sufficient	   justification	   for	  
abandoning	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment’s	  warrant	   requirement	  when	   a	  
foreign	   agent	   or	   power	   is	   involved.50	   The	   Court	   solidified	   the	  
distinction	  between	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  targets	  in	  the	  case	  that	  has	  
become	  known	  as	  ”Keith.”51	   In	  Keith,	   the	  Court	  once	  again	   failed	  to	  
reign	   in	   the	   Executive’s	   expansive	   and	   ever-­‐growing	   foreign	  
intelligence	  powers	  by	  reserving	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  warrant	  
requirement	   applied	   to	   foreign	   intelligence	   surveillance	   for	   a	   later	  
decision.52	   Though	   the	   holding	   made	   clear	   that	   the	   warrant	  
requirement	  could	  not	  be	  circumvented	  in	  investigations	  of	  domestic	  
security	  threats53,	  the	  Keith	  decision	  also	  implied	  that	  not	  adhering	  to	  
the	   warrant	   requirement	   “may	   be	   constitutional	   where	   foreign	  
powers	  are	   involved.”54	  The	  Court’s	  balancing	  test	  to	  determine	  the	  
                                                
50	  See,	  e.g.	  United	  States	  v.	  Smith,	  321	  F.	  Supp.	  424,	  425-­‐26	  (D.D.	  Cal.	  1971)	  
(emphasis	  added).	  
51	  United	  States	  v.	  United	  States	  District	  Court	  (Keith),	  407	  U.S.	  297	  (1972).	  The	  
defendants	  in	  Keith	  were	  charged	  with	  the	  bombing	  of	  a	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency	  
building	  in	  Ann	  Arbor,	  Michigan,	  and	  information	  garnered	  through	  warrantless	  
wiretaps	  formed	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  indictment	  against	  them.	  	  
52	  Id.	  at	  321-­‐22	  (“[T]his	  case	  involves	  only	  the	  domestic	  aspect	  of	  national	  security.	  
We	  have	  not	  addressed…the	  issues	  which	  may	  be	  involved	  with	  respect	  to	  activities	  
of	  foreign	  powers	  or	  their	  agents.”)	  (emphasis	  added).	  
53	  Id.	  at	  320.	  See	  also	  Amicus	  Curiae	  Brief	  of	  Former	  Members	  of	  the	  Church	  
Committee	  and	  Law	  Professors	  in	  Support	  of	  Petitioners	  at	  26,	  In	  re	  Electronic	  
Privacy	  Information	  Ctr.,	  No.	  13-­‐58	  (2013)	  (“The	  ‘inherent	  vagueness	  of	  the	  
domestic	  security	  concept,’	  and	  the	  significant	  possibility	  that	  it	  be	  abused	  to	  quash	  
political	  dissent,	  underscored	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment—
particularly	  when	  the	  government	  was	  engaged	  in	  spying	  on	  its	  own	  citizens.	  (citing	  
Keith,	  407	  U.S.	  at	  323)”).	  
54	  Keith,	  407	  U.S.	  at	  322,	  note	  20.	  Though	  the	  Court	  claimed	  that	  it	  “expressed	  no	  
opinion”	  as	  to	  national	  security	  and	  foreign	  powers,	  note	  20	  of	  the	  opinion	  endorses	  
the	  idea	  that	  “warrantless	  surveillance,	  though	  impermissible	  in	  domestic	  security	  
cases,	  may	  be	  constitutional	  where	  foreign	  powers	  are	  involved”	  by	  listing	  a	  number	  
of	  cases	  in	  support	  of	  that	  assertion.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Court	  provided	  no	  
authority	  for	  the	  position	  that	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  also	  applied	  to	  cases	  
involving	  foreign	  powers.	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reasonableness	  of	  the	  search	  weighed	  the	  privacy	  of	  citizens	  against	  
the	  concern	  that	  a	  warrant	  requirement	  would	  “unduly	  frustrate”	  the	  
efforts	   of	   the	   government	   to	   protect	   itself	   from	   national	   security	  
threats.	   The	   balance	   underscored	   the	   considerable	  weight	   given	   to	  
the	   government’s	   need	   to	   guard	   against	   potential	   national	   security	  
threats.	  
	  
III. THE	  STATE	  OF	  THE	  EXCEPTION	  BEFORE	  FISA	  
	  
A. The	  “Birth”	  of	  the	  Exception	  
	  
	   Because	  Executives	  since	  the	  dawn	  of	  the	  US	  proceeded	  under	  the	  
assumption	   that	   they	   could	   act	  with	   almost	  unilateral	   authority,	   not	  
bound	   by	   any	   Fourth	   Amendment	   requirements,	   in	   the	   area	   of	  
intelligence	   collecting,	   it	   is	   challenging	   to	  pinpoint	   the	   “birth”	  of	   the	  
foreign	   intelligence	  exception.	  One	  could	  say	   that	   the	  exception	  was	  
born	   the	   instant	   George	   Washington	   put	   his	   intelligence-­‐gathering	  
network	  into	  action	  with	  no	  regard	  for	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  and	  no	  
objection	   from	   Congress	   or	   the	   judiciary.	   Judicial	   deference	   in	   the	  
area	  bolstered	  the	  appeal	  and	  applicability	  of	  the	  exception,	  and	  early	  
cases	  such	  as	  Olmstead	  and	  Katz	  failed	  to	  take	  any	  stance	  on	  the	  role	  
of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  in	  national	  security	  investigations,	  implicitly	  
underwriting	  the	  Executive’s	  perceived	  preeminence	  and	  authority	  in	  
the	   area.	   Though	   few	   ordinary	   citizens	  were	   aware	   of	   its	   existence,	  
nearly	  every	  president	   relied	  on	  the	   foreign	   intelligence	  exception	   in	  
undertaking	   some	   form	   of	   surveillance	   without	   first	   obtaining	   a	  
warrant.55	   Prior	   to	   Katz,	   the	   Court	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   the	   Fourth	  
Amendment	   was	   not	   even	   a	   consideration	   when	   dealing	   with	  
electronic	   surveillance.56	   However,	   even	   after	   Katz	   described	   the	  
reasonableness	  test	  and	  mandated	  that	  it	  be	  applied	  in	  cases	  involving	  
electronic	  surveillance,	  the	  Executive	  continued	  to	  undertake	  massive	  
warrantless	  surveillance	  of	  both	   foreign	  and	  domestic	   targets	  on	  the	  
                                                
55	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  assertion	  by	  the	  D.C.	  Circuit	  in	  Ehrlichman,	  discussed	  supra	  note	  49,	  
that	  Executives	  since	  1940	  have	  espoused,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  courts,	  a	  “foreign	  
affairs”	  exception.	  See	  also	  Keith,	  407	  U.S.	  at	  311,	  note	  10	  (describing	  the	  pervasive	  
use	  of	  electronic	  surveillance	  by	  Executives	  since	  President	  Truman	  authorized	  his	  
Attorney	  General	  to	  wiretap	  phones	  without	  a	  warrant	  in	  the	  name	  of	  domestic	  
security	  in	  a	  1946	  memo).	  
56	  See	  Olmstead	  v.	  United	  States,	  277	  U.S.	  438,	  466	  (1928).	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basis	  of	  national	  security.	  
	   	  
B. Title	  III	  of	  the	  Omnibus	  Crime	  Control	  and	  Safe	  Streets	  Act	  	  
	  
	   The	   reluctance	   to	   limit	   the	   Executive	   in	   the	   area	   of	   foreign	  
intelligence	  gathering	  did	  not	   rest	  with	   the	   judiciary	  alone.	  Congress	  
similarly	   squandered	   opportunities	   to	   regulate	   the	   Executive’s	  
expansive	   intelligence	   collection.	  When	   Congress	   responded	   to	  Katz	  
by	  enacting	  Title	  III	  of	  the	  Omnibus	  Crime	  Control	  and	  Safe	  Streets	  Act	  
of	   1968	   (hereinafter	   “Title	   III”),	   which	   laid	   out	   the	   procedures	   for	  
obtaining	   a	   wiretap,	   it	   expressly	   avoided	   the	   regulation	   of	   foreign	  
intelligence	   surveillance.57	   The	   new	   rules	   for	   law	   enforcement	  were	  
aimed	   at	   ensuring	   citizens’	   reasonable	   expectations	   of	   privacy	  were	  
respected	  as	  the	  holding	  of	  Katz	  required,	  but	  their	  application	  to	  only	  
domestic	   law	   enforcement	   implied	   that	   different,	   though	   not	   at	   all	  
elucidated,	   standards	   governed	   intelligence	   surveillance	   when	   a	  
foreign	   agent	   was	   somehow	   involved.	   The	   foreign	   intelligence	  
exception	  continued	  to	  evolve	  into	  a	  powerful	  investigatory	  tool	  with	  
no	  oversight	  from	  Congress.	  
	  
C. Judicial	  Interpretations	  of	  the	  Exception	  after	  Katz	  
	  
	   The	   ambiguous	   boundary	   between	   foreign	   and	   domestic	  
intelligence	   surveillance	   was	   only	   exacerbated	   by	   further	   judicial	  
interpretations	   of	   the	   application	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   to	   the	  
Executive’s	  national	  security	  powers	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  Title	  III.	  One	  
of	   the	   first	   cases	   after	   Katz	   and	   Title	   III	   involving	   warrantless	  
surveillance	   justified	  on	   the	   grounds	  of	   national	   security	   never	   even	  
mentioned	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.58	  There	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  pervasive	  
acceptance	  of	   the	   inability	   of	   the	  Court	   to	   challenge	   the	   Executive’s	  
assertion	   of	   a	   need,	   which	   would	   be	   significantly	   frustrated	   by	   a	  
warrant	  requirement,	  for	  certain	  surveillance	  justified	  on	  the	  grounds	  
of	  national	  security.59	  	  
                                                
57	  See	  Keith,	  407	  U.S.	  at	  306.	  See	  also	  The	  Omnibus	  Crime	  Control	  and	  Safe	  Streets	  
Act,	  codified	  at	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  2511(3)	  (1968);	  explanation	  infra	  note	  84	  (discussing	  Title	  
III’s	  non-­‐application	  for	  foreign	  intelligence	  and	  national	  security).	  
58	  See	  United	  States	  v.	  Clay,	  430	  F.2d	  165	  (5th	  Cir.	  1970).	  
59	  See,	  e.g.,	  United	  States	  v.	  Enten,	  388	  F.	  Supp.	  97	  (D.D.C.	  1971)	  (The	  court	  did	  “not	  
believe	  the	  judiciary	  should	  question	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  executive	  department	  that	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   Keith	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  toward	  curbing	  
this	   unfettered	   executive	   power,	   with	   the	   Court	   requiring	   the	  
government	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   warrant	   requirement	   and	   receive	  
prior	   judicial	   approval	   for	  domestic	   security	   claims.	   It	   appeared	  as	   if	  
privacy	   rights	   had	   won	   the	   balancing	   test	   battle,	   trumping	   the	  
Executive’s	   concerns	   of	   domestic	   security.	   However,	   Keith’s	   limited	  
holding	   and	   potentially	   ambiguous	   application	   left	   open	   a	   void	   the	  
government	  was	  ready	  to	   fill.60	  By	  declining	  to	  detail	   the	  procedures	  
necessary	   to	   obtain	   a	   domestic	   surveillance	   warrant	   that	   the	   Court	  
now	  required	  and	  failing	  to	  thoroughly	  define	  “foreign”	  power	  and	  the	  
relationship	   the	   foreign	   power	   must	   have	   to	   the	   surveillance,	   Keith	  
simply	   invited	  the	  Executive	  to	  continue	  as	   it	  had	  been,	  so	   long	  as	   it	  
could	  claim	  some	  vague	  relationship	  to	  a	  foreign	  agent	  in	  each	  case.	  	  
	   Keith	  and	  Title	   III	  did	   little	  to	  alter	  the	  legal	   landscape	  in	  which	  
the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   had	   developed	   and	   thrived.	   In	  
applying	   Keith,	   District	   Courts	   of	   Appeal	   almost	   unanimously	  
recognized	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   in	  
upholding	   warrantless	   government	   wiretaps.61	   In	   1973,	   the	   Fifth	  
Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  declared	  that	  the	  President’s	  authorization	  of	  
warrantless	  wiretaps	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  gathering	  foreign	  intelligence	  
did	  not	   violate	   the	  Fourth	  Amendment.62	  Reaffirming	   the	  dichotomy	  
                                                                                                                
such	  surveillances	  are	  reasonable	  and	  necessary	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  national	  
interest.”).	  
60	  “In	  the	  end,	  [Keith]	  left	  open	  the	  vacuum	  created	  by	  prior	  reluctance	  to	  regulate	  
foreign	  intelligence	  surveillances,	  continued	  uncertainty	  as	  to	  the	  proper	  application	  
of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  and	  the	  unabated	  exploitation	  of	  warrantless	  foreign	  
intelligence	  surveillances	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  President’s	  inherent	  national	  security	  
powers.”	  	  David	  Hardin,	  The	  Fuss	  over	  Two	  Small	  Words:	  The	  Unconstitutionality	  of	  
the	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act	  Amendments	  to	  FISA	  Under	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment,	  71	  GEO.	  
WASH.	  L.	  REV.	  291,	  301	  (2003).	  
61	  See,	  e.g.,	  Stephanie	  Kornblum,	  Winning	  the	  Battle	  While	  Losing	  the	  War:	  
Ramifications	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  Court	  of	  Review’s	  First	  
Decision,	  27	  SEATTLE	  UNIV.	  L.	  R.	  623,	  634	  (2003)	  (“Virtually	  every	  court	  that	  addressed	  
the	  issue	  prior	  to	  the	  enactment	  of	  FISA	  concluded	  that	  the	  President	  had	  the	  
inherent	  power	  to	  conduct	  warrantless	  electronic	  surveillance	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
collecting	  foreign	  intelligence	  information,	  and	  any	  such	  surveillance	  constituted	  an	  
exception	  to	  the	  warrant	  requirement	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.”	  (citing	  United	  
States	  v.	  Butenko,	  494	  F.2d	  593,	  605	  (3d	  Cir.	  1974);	  Ivanov	  v.	  United	  States,	  419	  U.S.	  
881	  (1974);	  United	  States	  v.	  Brown,	  484	  F.2d	  418,	  426-­‐27	  (5th	  Cir.	  1973);	  United	  
States	  v.	  Clay,	  430	  F.2d	  165	  (5th	  Cir.	  1970))	  (emphasis	  added).	  
62	  See	  Brown,	  414	  F.2d	  at	  426.	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between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  intelligence,	  the	  Fifth	  Circuit	  reasoned	  
that	  “[r]estrictions	  upon	  the	  President's	  power	  which	  are	  appropriate	  
in	   cases	   of	   domestic	   security	   become	   artificial	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
international	   sphere.”63	   Importantly,	   the	   Fifth	   Circuit	   also	   required	  
nothing	   more	   than	   the	   Attorney	   General’s	   bare	   assertion	   that	   the	  
surveillance	   was	   conducted	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   gathering	   foreign	  
intelligence.64	   This	   ensured	   that	   the	   government	   could	   continue	  
electronic	   surveillance	   so	   long	   as	   they	   could	   somehow	   creatively	  
attach	   the	   label	   of	   “foreign,”	   which,	   like	   Keith,	   only	   encouraged	  
further	   abuses	   of	   the	   constitutional	   requirements	   of	   probable	   cause	  
and	  a	  warrant.	  
	   	   Though	   few	   courts	   expressly	   declared	   the	   existence	   of	   a	   foreign	  
intelligence	   exception,	   and	   the	   “Supreme	   Court	   generally	   remained	  
silent	  on	  the	  question	  of	  Fourth	  Amendment	  protections	  and	  foreign	  
intelligence	  gathering,”65	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  such	  an	  exception	  was	  alive	  
and	  well.66	   	  
	  
D. The	  “Primary	  Purpose”	  Test	  
	  
	   Despite	   its	  widespread	  acceptance	  and	  application,	   the	   foreign	  
intelligence	  exception	  did	  not	  develop	  entirely	  without	  regulation	  and	  
restraint.	   The	   most	   significant	   legal	   guideline	   created	   alongside	   the	  
foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   came	   to	   be	   known	   as	   the	   “primary	  
purpose	  test.”	   	  Designed	  as	  a	  response	  to	  Keith	  and	  solidified	  by	  the	  
Fourth	  Circuit	  in	  Truong	  Dinh,67	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	  declared	  any	  
warrantless	   search	   to	  be	   constitutionally	   reasonable	  and	  permissible	  
so	  long	  as	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  surveillance	  was	  the	  collection	  
                                                
63	  Id.;	  See	  also	  Elizabeth	  Gillingham	  Daily,	  Beyond	  “Persons,	  Houses,	  Papers,	  and	  
Effects”:	  Re-­‐Writing	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  for	  National	  Security	  Surveillance,	  10	  
LEWIS	  &	  CLARK	  L.	  REV.	  641,	  653	  (2006)	  (“[A]	  warrant	  requirement	  [for	  foreign	  
surveillance]	  would	  unduly	  frustrate	  the	  President	  in	  protecting	  national	  security	  
from	  foreign	  threats.	  First,	  foreign	  intelligence	  surveillance	  requires	  ‘the	  utmost	  
stealth,	  speed,	  and	  secrecy.’	  Second,	  the	  judiciary	  is	  largely	  inexperienced	  in	  
analyzing	  foreign	  intelligence	  information.	  And	  third,	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  is	  
constitutionally	  imbued	  with	  preeminent	  authority	  to	  conduct	  foreign	  affairs.”	  
(citing	  United	  States	  v.	  Truong	  Dinh	  Hung,	  629	  F.2d	  908	  (4th	  Cir.	  1980)).	  
64	  Brown,	  414	  F.2d	  at	  426.	  
65	  Anzaldi	  &	  Gannon,	  supra,	  note	  43,	  at	  1603.	  
66	  See	  supra	  note	  61	  (listing	  courts	  upholding	  a	  foreign	  intelligence	  exceptions).	  
67	  United	  States	  v.	  Truong	  Dinh	  Hung,	  629	  F.2d	  908	  (4th	  Cir.	  1980).	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of	  foreign	  intelligence	  information.68	  
	   At	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  
while	   a	   search	   aimed	   at	   finding	   evidence	   to	   be	   used	   in	   a	   criminal	  
prosecution	   can	   run	   afoul	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   if	   conducted	  
without	   a	   warrant,	   a	   search	   whose	   primary	   goal	   is	   intelligence	  
collection	  does	  not	  violate	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment.	  The	  origins	  of	  this	  
belief	  are	  difficult	   to	   trace.	  Though	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	   is	  most	  
often	   associated	   with	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception,	   the	   Court	  
applied	   a	   similar	   analysis	   in	   previous	   Fourth	   Amendment	   warrant	  
exception	  jurisprudence.69	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  Court	  used	  
primary	   purpose	   language	   when	   examining	   the	   intrusiveness	   of	  
administrative	   searches	   that	   spawned	   the	   special	   needs	  exception.70	  
However,	   the	   language	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   makes	   no	  
distinction	   between	   criminal	   and	   any	   other	   type	   of	   investigation,	   so	  
this	  assumption	   is	   troubling	  and	  rests	  on	  a	  constitutional	   foundation	  
that	  is	  shaky	  at	  best.71	  	  
	   The	  minimal	  prerequisite	   required	  by	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	  
cemented	  the	  second	  dichotomy	  that	  shaped	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  
exception	   before	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   Patriot	   Act	   –	   the	   separation	  
between	   intelligence	   collection	   and	   criminal	   investigation.	   As	  
warrantless	   investigative	   techniques	  became	  an	   indispensible	   tool	   in	  
the	  government’s	  security	  operations,	  executive	  branch	  officials	   self-­‐
imposed	   what	   one	   author	   calls	   “the	   pure	   intelligence	   rule”	   as	   an	  
acknowledgement	   of	   the	   protections	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.72	  
This	   pure	   intelligence	   rule	   permitted	   warrantless	   investigation	   but	  
barred	   the	   evidence	   gathered	   through	   such	   techniques	   from	   being	  
used	   in	   criminal	  prosecutions	   to	  ensure	   that	  warrantless	   intelligence	  
searches	  remained	  within	  the	  bounds	  of	  reasonableness	  prescribed	  by	  
                                                
68	  See	  Id.	  at	  915.	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Butenko,	  494	  F.2d	  593,	  606	  (3d	  Cir.	  1974).	  
69	  See,	  e.g.,	  City	  of	  Indianapolis	  v.	  Edmond,	  531	  U.S.	  32,	  35	  (2000)	  (declining	  to	  apply	  
the	  special	  needs	  exception	  where	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  investigation	  was	  
general	  law	  enforcement,	  rather	  than	  a	  compelling	  non-­‐law	  enforcement	  
administrative	  goal,	  such	  as	  public	  health	  or	  safety).	  
70	  Id.	  
71	  See	  supra	  note	  9	  (text	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment).	  
72	  See	  L.	  Rush	  Atkinson,	  The	  Fourth	  Amendment’s	  National	  Security	  Exception:	  Its	  
History	  and	  Limits,	  66	  VAND.	  L.	  REV.	  1343,	  1362	  (2013)	  (describing	  the	  “pure	  
intelligence	  rule”	  as	  a	  prophylactic	  self-­‐imposed	  by	  the	  FBI	  and	  other	  intelligence	  
agencies	  to	  protect	  criminal	  prosecutions	  from	  being	  tainted	  by	  warrantless	  
intelligence	  surveillance).	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Circumventing	  the	  Constitution	  For	  National	  Security 227	  227	  
the	  Fourth	  Amendment.73	  
	   	  By	   separating	   national	   security	   investigations	   from	   criminal	  
investigations	   by	   deeming	   them	   minimally	   intrusive	   intelligence	  
searches	   rather	   than	   traditional	   evidentiary	   searches,	   the	   executive	  
branch	  attempted	  to	  place	  national	  security	  investigations	  outside	  the	  
realm	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  and	  its	  warrant	  and	  probable	  cause	  
requirements.74	   The	   judiciary’s	   tacit	   approval	   of	   a	   national	   security	  
exception	   to	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   only	   promulgated	   the	   use	   of	  
warrantless	  surveillance	  and	  perpetuated	  the	  application	  of	  the	  pure	  
intelligence	   rule	   as	   a	   justification	   for	   circumventing	   the	   warrant	  
requirement.	   Like	   the	   national	   security	   exception,	   the	   primary	  
purpose	  test	  did	   little	   to	  set	  clear	  boundaries	   for	   the	  government	  or	  




	   The	  enactment	  of	  FISA	  is	  arguably	  the	  most	  significant	  event	  in	  
the	   storied	   history	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	  
exception.	  Until	  FISA,	  Congress	  had	  remained	  relatively	  mute	  as	  to	  the	  
executive	   branch’s	   powers	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   national	   security.75	  
However,	   the	   increasing	   sense	   in	   the	   early	   1970’s	   that	   the	  
government	  was	  spinning	  out	  of	  control	  forced	  Congress’s	  hand.	  FISA	  
moved	   Congress	   out	   of	   the	   shadows	   and	   into	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	  
debate	   concerning	   limitations	   to	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   government,	  
namely	   its	   surveillance	   programs,	   in	   order	   to	   protect	   citizens	   and	  
ensure	  compliance	  with	  the	  Constitution.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  Congress	  
was	  poised	  to	  exercise	   its	  power	  to	  check	  and	  balance	  the	  executive	  
branch	  and	  demand	  accountability.	  	  
	  
A. The	  Church	  Committee	  &	  the	  Creation	  of	  FISA	  	  
	  
	   In	  response	  to	  the	  overwhelming	  unpopularity	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  
and	  public	  outrage	  over	  the	  Watergate	  scandal	  and	  numerous	  media	  
                                                
73	  See	  Id.	  	  
74	  See	  Id.	  
75	  See,	  e.g.,	  Kollar,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  76	  (“[F]or	  decades	  prior	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  FISA,	  
Congress	  imposed	  no	  constraints	  on	  the	  executive	  with	  regards	  to	  gathering	  any	  
information	  that	  fell	  under	  the	  aegis	  of	  national	  security.”	  (citing	  United	  States	  v.	  
United	  States	  District	  Court	  (Keith),	  407	  U.S.	  297,	  310-­‐11	  (1972)).	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reports	   detailing	   the	   rampant	   abuses	   of	   law	   and	   power	   by	   the	  
Executive	   and	   intelligence	   agencies,76	   Congress	   assembled	   the	  
predecessor	   of	   the	   Senate	   Select	   Committee	   on	   Intelligence	   and	  
charged	   it	   with	   investigating	   the	   illegality	   of	   actions	   by	   the	   FBI	   and	  
other	   intelligence	   agencies.	   Headed	   by	   Senator	   Frank	   Church,	   a	  
sixteen-­‐year	   veteran	   of	   the	   Committee	   of	   Foreign	   Relations,	   the	  
United	   States	   Senate	   Select	   Committee	   to	   Study	   Governmental	  
Operations	   with	   Respect	   to	   Intelligence	   Activities	   (hereinafter	   “the	  
Church	   Committee”)	   published	   fourteen	   reports	   between	   1975	   and	  
1976	   that	   analyzed	   the	   scope	   and	   history	   of	   US	   intelligence	  
operations.	  
	   The	   Church	   Committee’s	   investigation	   involved	   one	   hundred	  
twenty-­‐six	   full	   committee	   meetings,	   forty	   subcommittee	   hearings,	  
more	  than	  eight	  hundred	  witness	  interviews,	  and	  extensive	  review	  of	  
more	  than	  one	  hundred	  ten	  thousand	  documents.77	  Their	  final	  report,	  
published	  on	  April	  29,	  1976,	  	   included	   a	   litany	   of	   abuses	   and	  
concluded	   that	   “[i]ntelligence	   agencies	   have	   undermined	   the	  
constitutional	  rights	  of	  citizens	  primarily	  because	  checks	  and	  balances	  
designed	  by	   the	   framers	  of	   the	  Constitution	   to	  assure	  accountability	  
have	  not	  been	  applied.”78	  	  The	  scathing	  report	  beseeched	  all	  branches	  
of	  the	  government	  to	  take	  action	  to	  “ensure	  that	  the	  pattern	  of	  abuse	  






                                                
76	  Congress	  was	  spurred	  into	  action	  largely	  by	  a	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  published	  in	  
1974	  that	  exposed	  a	  domestic	  spying	  operation	  the	  CIA	  had	  undertaken	  for	  nearly	  
ten	  years	  in	  direct	  violation	  of	  the	  agency’s	  charter.	  See	  Seymour	  M.	  Hersh,	  Huge	  
C.I.A.	  Operation	  Reported	  in	  U.S.	  Against	  Antiwar	  Forces,	  Other	  Dissidents	  in	  Nixon	  
Years,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  December	  22,	  1974,	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/238963-­‐huge-­‐c-­‐i-­‐a-­‐operation-­‐reported-­‐
in-­‐u-­‐s-­‐against.html.	  
77	  Select	  Committee	  to	  Study	  Governmental	  Operations	  with	  Respect	  to	  Intelligence	  
Activities,	  Supplementary	  Detailed	  Staff	  Reports	  of	  Intelligence	  Activities	  and	  the	  
Rights	  of	  Americans,	  Book	  III,	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  94-­‐755,	  at	  III	  (1976),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94755_II.pdf.	  
78	  	  Id.	  at	  302.	  
79	  Id.	  at	  21.	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B. Legislative	  Intent	  
	  
	   The	   reports	   of	   the	   Church	   Committee	   highlighted	   the	   failures	   of	  
the	   judiciary	   to	   curtail	   intelligence	   abuses	   and	   emphasized	   the	   dire	  
need	   “for	   statutory	   restraints	   coupled	   with	   much	   more	   effective	  
oversight	   from	   all	   branches	   of	   the	   Government.”	   80	   Rather	   than	  
continue	   to	   rely	  on	   the	  courts,	  which	  were	  hesitant	   to	  even	  address	  
national	   security	   issues,	   let	   alone	   create	   workable	   rules	   for	  
intelligence	   investigations,	   Congress	   designed	   FISA	   to	   act	   as	   clear	  
guidelines	  that	  would	  safeguard	  Americans	  from	  intelligence	  agencies	  
that	   had	   long	   exploited	   conflicting	   interpretations	   of	   ambiguous	  
limits.81	  FISA	  represented	  Congress’s	  attempt	  to	  strike	  the	  appropriate	  
balance	  between	  the	  nation’s	  obligation	  to	  protect	  the	  security	  of	  its	  
citizens	   and	   borders	   and	   the	   constitutional	   rights	   and	   civil	   liberties	  
guaranteed	  to	  all	  Americans	  through	  the	  Constitution.82	  
	  
C. Relevant	  Changes	  to	  Existing	  Framework	  
	  
	   Congress’s	  attempt	  to	  strike	  this	  balance	  was	  arguably	  a	  massive	  
failure	  that	  did	  little	  to	  curb	  the	  excess	  and	  abuses	  that	  inspired	  FISA’s	  
creation.	   Instead	  of	  eliminating	  or	  reigning	  in	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  
exception,	  Congress	  essentially	  codified	  the	  exception.	  FISA	  gave	   law	  
enforcement	   a	   roadmap	   detailing	   just	   how	   to	   use	   the	   foreign	  
intelligence	   exception	   to	   thwart	   the	   civil	   liberties	   that	   the	   Fourth	  
Amendment	  was	   expressly	   designed	   to	   protect.	   Federal	   agents	   now	  
knew	   just	   how	   to	   tweak	   warrant	   applications	   to	   get	   whatever	   they	  
wanted	   with	   no	   regard	   for	   the	   Constitution.	   By	   creatively	   attaching	  
the	   label	   of	   “foreign”	   to	   a	   surveillance	   target,	   the	   government	   was	  
now	  exempt	  from	  establishing	  probable	  cause,	  obtaining	  a	  warrant,	  or	  
limiting	  its	  investigations	  in	  any	  significant	  way.83	  
                                                
80	  Id.	  at	  289	  (emphasis	  added).	  
81	  See	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  95-­‐604,	  pt.	  1,	  at	  3	  (1977),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance/FISA/Cmte_Reports_on_Original_Act/S
JC_FISA_Report_95-­‐604.pdf	  (“[FISA	  is]	  designed	  to	  clarify	  and	  make	  more	  explicit	  
the	  statutory	  intent,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  provide	  further	  safeguards	  for	  individuals	  
subjected	  to	  electronic	  surveillance….”).	  
82	  See	  Id.	  at	  4.	  
83	  For	  an	  example	  of	  how	  the	  government	  was	  able	  to	  craftily	  use	  the	  label	  of	  
“foreign”	  to	  circumvent	  the	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  Americans,	  see	  Amicus	  Curiae	  
Brief	  of	  Former	  Members	  of	  the	  Church	  Committee	  and	  Law	  Professors	  in	  Support	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i. The	  Fate	  of	  the	  Primary	  Purpose	  Test	  
	  
	   While	  the	  more	  stringent	  requirements	  of	  Title	   III	  continued	  to	  
govern	   warrant	   procedures	   for	   surveillance	   of	   domestic	   security	  
targets,84	  FISA	  filled	  the	  void	  courts	  had	  left	  by	  failing	  to	  prescribe	  any	  
restrictions	  for	  foreign	  intelligence	  gathering.	  Acknowledging	  the	  legal	  
framework	   pre-­‐FISA	   courts	   attempted	   to	   forge	   by	   establishing	   the	  
primary	  purpose	  test,	  FISA	  made	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	  an	  integral	  
part	  of	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception.	  	  
	   In	   order	   for	   a	   federal	   officer	   (usually	   an	   NSA	   or	   FBI	   agent)	   to	  
obtain	  a	  warrant	  for	  foreign	  intelligence	  surveillance	  under	  FISA,	  he	  or	  
she	   needs	   to	   first	   obtain	   approval	   from	   the	   Attorney	   General,	   who	  
must	  certify	  that	  “the	  target	  of	  the	  electronic	  surveillance	  is	  a	  foreign	  
power	  or	  an	  agent	  of	  a	  foreign	  power.”85	  After	  obtaining	  this	  approval,	  
the	   officer	   submits	   the	   application	   to	   the	   Foreign	   Intelligence	  
Surveillance	   Court	   (hereinafter	   “FISC”).	   The	   proceedings	   of	   FISC	   are	  
conducted	   entirely	   in	   secret,	   with	   only	   a	   representative	   of	   the	  
government	   present,	   and	   are	   subject	   only	   to	   minimal	   review.	   For	  
review	   by	   FISC,	   a	   FISA	   application	   must	   also	   include	   a	   certification	  
from	   “an	   executive	   branch	   official	   or	   officials	   designated	   by	   the	  
President	  from	  among	  those	  executive	  officers	  employed	   in	  the	  area	  
of	  national	  security	  or	  defense”	  that	  “the	  purpose	  of	  the	  surveillance	  
is	   to	   obtain	   foreign	   intelligence	   information.”86	   FISA	   therefore	  
                                                                                                                
of	  the	  Petitioners,	  In	  re	  Electronic	  Privacy	  Information	  Ctr	  at	  8,	  2013	  U.S.	  C.	  Ct.	  Briefs	  
LEXIS	  3326	  (No.	  13-­‐58)	  (Aug.	  12,	  2013)	  (“The	  government	  now	  argues	  that	  all	  
telephone	  calls	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  including	  those	  of	  a	  wholly	  local	  nature,	  are	  
‘relevant’	  to	  foreign	  intelligence	  investigations.”).	  
84	  Though	  Title	  III	  was	  clearly	  aimed	  at	  domestic	  surveillance,	  its	  application	  to	  
surveillance	  in	  the	  name	  of	  national	  security	  was	  quite	  ambiguous.	  As	  originally	  
drafted,	  Title	  II	  stated	  that,	  “Nothing	  contained	  in	  this	  chapter…shall	  limit	  the	  
constitutional	  power	  of	  the	  President	  to	  take	  such	  measures	  he	  deems	  necessary	  to	  
protect	  the	  Nation	  against	  actual	  or	  potential	  attack….”	  18	  U.S.C.	  §	  2511(3)	  (1968).	  
This	  provision	  was	  deleted	  when	  FISA	  was	  enacted	  and	  was	  replaced	  with	  a	  
reference	  to	  FISA’s	  foreign	  intelligence	  gathering	  procedures.	  	  18	  U.S.C.	  §	  2511(2)(f)	  
(2000).	  See	  also	  Jessica	  M.	  Bungard,	  The	  Fine	  Line	  Between	  Security	  and	  Liberty:	  The	  
“Secret”	  Court	  Struggle	  to	  Determine	  the	  Path	  of	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  in	  
the	  Wake	  of	  September	  11th,	  4	  PGH	  J.	  TECH.	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  6,	  7	  (2004).	  
85	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1804(a)(3)(A)	  (2014).	  	  
86	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1804(a)(6)(B)	  (1978)	  (emphasis	  added);	  “‘Foreign	  intelligence	  
information’	  means-­‐-­‐	  (1)	  information	  that	  relates	  to,	  and	  if	  concerning	  a	  United	  
States	  person	  is	  necessary	  to,	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  protect	  against-­‐	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completely	   embraces	   the	   primary	   purpose	   test	   as	   the	   appropriate	  
determination	  of	  the	  reasonableness	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  foreign	  
intelligence	  exception.	  
	   Though	   the	   primary	   purpose	   test	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   demanding	  
requirement,	   the	  application	  approval	   rates	  of	  FISC	  certainly	   suggest	  
otherwise.	  In	  the	  period	  between	  FISC’s	  creation	  and	  September	  11th	  
(1978-­‐2001),	  FISC	  granted	  more	  than	  thirteen	  thousand	  FISA	  warrant	  
applications	  but	  denied	  not	  one	  single	  application.87	  Though	  Congress	  
denied	  that	  FISA	  was	  used	  to	  subvert	  constitutional	  rights,88	  in	  reality,	  
FISA	   and	   FISC	   morphed	   the	   primary	   purpose	   test	   from	   a	   strict	  
protection	   into	   a	   rubber	   stamp	   condoning	   any	   and	   all	   government	  
surveillance.	   The	   weakening	   of	   the	   primary	   purpose	   test	   is	   due	   in	  
large	  part	  to	  the	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  executive	  
branch	   is	   the	   preeminent	   national	   security	   authority	   and	   its	   bare	  
assertion	  of	  a	  foreign	  intelligence	  objective	  is	  sufficient	  to	  invoke	  the	  
foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   and	   do	   away	   with	   the	   imperatives	   of	  
probable	   cause	   and	   a	   warrant.89	   FISA	   welcomed	   this	   notion	   by	  
providing	  that	  the	  certification	  that	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  surveillance	  is	  
foreign	  intelligence	  collection	  may	  not	  be	  reviewed	  by	  FISC	  unless	  the	  
surveillance	  targets	  a	  US	  citizen.90	  	  
US	  Circuit	  Courts	  of	  Appeals	  also	  widely	  endorsed	  the	  primary	  
purpose	   test	   as	   implicit	   in	   FISA	   and	   the	   appropriate	   standard	   of	  
                                                                                                                
(A)	  actual	  or	  potential	  attack	  or	  other	  grave	  hostile	  acts	  of	  a	  foreign	  power	  or	  an	  
agent	  of	  a	  foreign	  power;	  (B)	  sabotage,	  international	  terrorism,	  or	  the	  international	  
proliferation	  of	  weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction	  by	  a	  foreign	  power	  or	  an	  agent	  of	  a	  
foreign	  power;	  or	  (C)	  clandestine	  intelligence	  activities	  by	  an	  intelligence	  service	  or	  
network	  of	  a	  foreign	  power	  or	  by	  an	  agent	  of	  a	  foreign	  power;	  or	  (2)	  	  information	  
with	  respect	  to	  a	  foreign	  power	  or	  foreign	  territory	  that	  relates	  to,	  and	  if	  concerning	  
a	  United	  States	  person	  is	  necessary	  to-­‐-­‐	  (A)	  the	  national	  defense	  or	  the	  security	  of	  
the	  United	  States;	  or	  (B)	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  foreign	  affairs	  of	  the	  United	  States.”	  50	  
U.S.C.	  §	  1801(e)	  (2014).	  	  
87	  Electronic	  Privacy	  Information	  Center,	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  Act	  Court	  
Orders	  1979-­‐2012, 	  available	  at	  	  
http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html.	  
88	  S.	  COMM.	  ON	  INTELLIGENCE,	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  98-­‐665,	  at	  36	  (1984)	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs98th/98665.pdf	  (stating	  that	  the	  sharp	  
increase	  in	  the	  approval	  of	  FISA	  warrant	  applications	  ‘does	  not	  reflect	  any	  relaxation	  
in	  strict	  protections	  for	  the	  privacy	  of	  US	  persons.’).	  
89	  See	  supra	  note	  59.	  	  
90	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1805(a)(4)	  (2014).	  Even	  if	  the	  target	  of	  the	  surveillance	  is	  a	  US	  citizen,	  
the	  certification	  is	  reviewable	  only	  under	  the	  minimal	  standard	  of	  clear	  error.	  Id.	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constitutional	  reasonableness	  in	  FISA	  cases.	  “[T]he	  circuit	  courts	  have	  
ruled	   that	   FISA	  provides	   for	   a	   justifiable	   imposition	  on	  private	   rights	  
where	   the	   ‘primary	   purpose’	   of	   the	   warrants	   has	   been	   to	   gather	  
foreign	   intelligence	   information	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   national	   security,	  
and	  not	  to	  further	  a	  criminal	  prosecution.”91	  In	  upholding	  the	  primary	  
purpose	   test,	   the	   circuit	   courts	   also	   affirmed	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  
dichotomy	   between	   foreign	   intelligence	   gathering	   and	   criminal	  
investigation	  and	  prosecution.	  
	  
ii. The	  FISA	  “Wall”	  
	  
	   The	   government’s	   efforts	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   primary	   purpose	  
test	   led	   to	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   “FISA	   wall.”	   Though	   the	   legislative	  
history	   of	   FISA	   indicates	   Congress’s	   recognition	   that	   foreign	  
intelligence	  collection	  and	  criminal	  law	  investigation	  and	  enforcement	  
will	  inevitably	  and	  necessarily	  overlap,92	  the	  consistent	  interpretation	  
of	  FISA	  by	  federal	  courts	  reading	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	  as	  implicit	  
in	  FISA	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  maintain	  a	  clear	  divide	  between	  the	  
two	   in	   order	   to	   comply	   with	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment’s	   mandate	   of	  
reasonableness.	   This	  quickly	   led	   to	   a	   concern	   that	   consultations	   and	  
interactions	   between	   intelligence	   agents	   and	   prosecutors	   would	  
severely	   diminish	   the	   assertion	   that	   intelligence	   collection	  was	   truly	  
                                                
91	  Kornblum,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  627	  (citing	  United	  States	  v.	  Duggan,	  743	  F.2d	  59	  (2d	  
Cir.	  1984);	  United	  States	  v.	  Badia,	  827	  F.2d	  1458	  (11th	  Cir.	  1987);	  United	  States	  v.	  
Johnson,	  952	  F.2d	  565	  (1st	  Cir.	  1991)).	  See	  also	  United	  States	  v.	  Megahey,	  553	  F.	  
Supp.	  1180,	  1188	  (E.D.N.Y.	  1982)	  (affirming	  that	  surveillance	  conducted	  pursuant	  to	  
a	  FISA	  warrant	  fits	  within	  the	  recognized	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception	  to	  the	  Fourth	  
Amendment’s	  warrant	  requirement	  and	  that	  application	  of	  this	  exception	  is	  
reasonable	  when	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  surveillance	  is	  foreign	  intelligence,	  
which	  is	  a	  requirement	  “clearly	  implicit	  in	  the	  FISA	  standards”);	  United	  States	  v.	  
Falvey,	  540	  F.	  Supp.	  1306,	  1314	  (E.D.N.Y	  1982)	  (holding	  a	  search	  conducted	  
pursuant	  to	  a	  FISA	  warrant	  to	  be	  reasonable	  because	  its	  primary	  purpose	  was	  
foreign	  intelligence	  information).	  
92	  See	  S.	  REP.	  NO.	  95-­‐604,	  at	  6	  (1978),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.cnss.org/data/files/Surveillance/FISA/Cmte_Reports_on_Original_Act/S
JC_FISA_Report_95-­‐604.pdf.	  But	  see,	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1801(h)(1)(2014)	  (Congress	  did	  
attempt	  to	  put	  in	  place	  limitations	  on	  information	  sharing	  when	  crafting	  FISA.	  Each	  
application	  for	  a	  FISA	  warrant	  is	  required	  to	  contain	  a	  description	  of	  “minimization	  
procedures”	  designed	  to	  “minimize	  the	  acquisition	  and	  retention,	  and	  prohibit	  the	  
dissemination,	  of	  nonpublicly	  available	  information”	  garnered	  through	  foreign	  
intelligence	  surveillance.).	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for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  foreign	   intelligence	  and	  not	  evidence	  of	  
criminal	  wrongdoing.93	  
	   In	   response	   to	   this	   apprehension	   and	   in	   order	   to	   limit	   any	  
appearance	   of	   coordination	   between	   intelligence	   agents	   and	  
prosecutors,	  the	  DOJ	  designed	  formal	  procedures	  to	  restrict	  the	  flow	  
of	  information	  from	  intelligence	  surveillance	  to	  law	  enforcement.	  Laid	  
out	   in	   a	   1995	   memorandum	   authored	   by	   Attorney	   General	   Janet	  
Reno,	   these	  procedures	   forbid	   “either	   the	   fact	  or	   the	  appearance	  of	  
the	   Criminal	   Division's	   directing	   or	   controlling	   the	   [foreign	  
intelligence]	   investigation	  toward	  law	  enforcement	  objectives”.94	  The	  
DOJ	   explicitly	   accepted	   and	   implemented	   the	   dichotomy	   between	  
foreign	  intelligence	  objectives	  and	  criminal	  prosecution	  as	  required	  by	  
the	  circuit	  courts’	   interpretations	  of	  FISA.	  However,	  the	  effect	  of	  this	  
division	   was	   an	   entirely	   ineffective	   measure	   that	   had	   devastating	  
results.	   “The	   [1995]	   procedures	   essentially	   cleaved	   the	   FBI	   into	   two	  
different	  bodies-­‐	  intelligence	  and	  law	  enforcement-­‐	  and	  restricted	  the	  
flow	   of	   information	   between	   the	   two.”95	   The	   FISA	   wall	   further	  
perverted	   the	   standard	   of	   reasonableness	   mandated	   by	   the	   Fourth	  
Amendment	  by	  enforcing	  a	  useless	  and	  illusory	  dichotomy	  that	  led	  to	  
intelligence	   failures	   that	   could	  arguably	  have	  prevented	   the	   terrorist	  
attacks	  of	  September	  11,	  2001.96	  
	  
                                                
93	  See	  David	  S.	  Kris,	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  FISA	  Wall,	  17	  STAN.	  L.	  &	  POL’Y	  REV.	  487,	  
498	  (2006)	  (explaining	  that	  although	  it	  was	  decided	  under	  pre-­‐FISA	  standards,	  
Truong	  Dinh	  was	  extremely	  influential	  on	  later	  judicial	  interpretations	  of	  FISA;	  in	  
determining	  that	  foreign	  intelligence	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  
investigation	  in	  Truong	  Dinh,	  the	  court	  examined	  the	  number	  and	  length	  of	  
consultations	  between	  the	  intelligence	  agents	  that	  conducted	  the	  surveillance	  and	  
the	  prosecutor	  that	  eventually	  charged	  Truong	  (citing	  United	  States	  v.	  Truong	  Dinh	  
Hung,	  629	  F.2d	  908	  (4th	  Cir.	  1980)).	  See	  also	  Daily,	  supra	  note	  63,	  at	  658	  (“If	  courts	  
thought	  that	  agents	  were	  using	  FISA	  surveillance	  primarily	  for	  criminal	  prosecution,	  
it	  would	  jeopardize	  the	  DOJ’s	  ability	  to	  use	  evidence	  obtained	  in	  FISA	  surveillance	  in	  
a	  later	  prosecution.”).	  
94	  Memorandum	  from	  Janet	  Reno,	  Attorney	  Gen.,	  to	  the	  Assistant	  Attorney	  Gen.	  of	  
the	  Criminal	  Div.,	  Procedures	  for	  Contacts	  Between	  the	  FBI	  Criminal	  Division	  
Concerning	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  and	  Foreign	  Counterintelligence	  Investigations,	  part	  
A,	  subsection	  6	  (July	  19,	  1995),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1995procs.html.	  
95	  Atkinson,	  supra	  note	  72,	  at	  1390,	  note	  240.	  
96	  See	  generally	  THE	  9/11	  COMMISSION	  REPORT	  (2004),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf.	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V. THE	  USA	  PATRIOT	  ACT	  
	  
	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   September	   11th	   and	   the	   numerous	   allegations	  
that	   the	   DOJ’s	   FISA	   walls	   prevented	   information	   sharing	   that	   could	  
have	  thwarted	  the	  deadly	  attacks,	  Congress	  was	  in	  an	  uproar	  over	  the	  
disastrous	  failures	  of	  the	  once-­‐lauded	  FISA.	  However,	  rather	  than	  take	  
the	  opportunity	   to	  reexamine	  the	  now	  overwhelming	  breadth	  of	   the	  
foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   and	   reevaluate	   the	   protections	   of	   the	  
Fourth	   Amendment	   in	   light	   of	   modern	   technology	   and	   threats,	  
Congress	   acted	   hastily	   to	   tear	   down	   the	   wall	   and	   expand	   the	  
Executive’s	  power.	  Enacted	   just	   forty-­‐five	  days	  after	  September	  11th,	  
the	   Patriot	   Act	   greatly	   broadened	   the	   latitude	   of	   the	   foreign	  
intelligence	   exception,	   which	   further	   eroded	   the	   constitutional	  
protections	  the	  government	  vows	  to	  uphold	  and	  defend.	  
	  
A. The	  Wall	  Comes	  Down	  
	  
	   Before	   September	   11th,	   FISA	   survived	   numerous	   constitutional	  
challenges	  because	   courts	   consistently	   reiterated	   that	   the	   separation	  
FISA	   maintained	   between	   law	   enforcement	   and	   intelligence	  
investigation	  ensured	  that	  searches	  conducted	  pursuant	  to	  FISA	  were	  
sufficiently	  reasonable	  so	  as	  to	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  Fourth	  
Amendment.97	   After	   the	   Patriot	   Act,	   the	   sound	   constitutional	  
foundation	   on	   which	   FISA	   and	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	  
seemed	   to	   rest	   was	   called	   into	   question.	   The	   increased	   information	  
sharing	   allowed	   by	   the	   Patriot	   Act	   destroyed	   the	   FISA	  walls	   that	   the	  
executive	   branch	   had	   so	   carefully	   erected	   to	   comply	   with	   judicial	  
restrictions	   on	   the	   government’s	   national	   security	   powers.98	   These	  
shattered	  walls	  demanded	  a	  new	  interpretation	  of	  what	  made	  a	  search	  
sufficiently	  reasonable	  so	  as	  to	  pass	  constitutional	  muster.	  
	  
B. Significant	  Purpose	  v.	  The	  Purpose	  
	  
	   By	   the	   time	   Congress	   passed	   the	   Patriot	   Act,	   the	   Fourth	  
Amendment	  prerequisites	  of	   probable	   cause	   and	  a	  warrant	  had	   long	  
been	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  a	   loose,	  fluid	  standard	  of	  reasonableness	  
                                                
97	  See	  supra	  note	  91.	  
98	  See,	  e.g.,	  USA	  PATRIOT	  Act,	  codified	  at	  50	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1804-­‐1806.	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in	   cases	   in	   which	   national	   security	   was	   involved.	   Decades	   of	   judicial	  
recognition	  of	  the	  paramount	  obligation	  of	  the	  government	  to	  protect	  
the	   nation’s	   security	   effectively	   shut	   out	   any	   arguments	   against	   the	  
recognition	   of	   the	   national	   security	   and	   foreign	   intelligence	  
exceptions.99	  Combined	  with	  the	  increasing	  willingness	  of	  the	  judiciary	  
to	   accept	   without	   question	   government	   insistences	   that	   national	  
security	   was	   being	   threatened,	   the	   Patriot	   Act’s	   diminishing	   of	   the	  
primary	   purpose	   test	   was	   all	   but	   inevitable.	   As	   unreasonable	   as	   the	  
total	   forsaking	   of	   the	   primary	   purpose	   standard	   of	   reasonableness	  
was,	  it	  should	  not	  have	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  to	  anyone.	  	  
	   Two	   weeks	   after	   September	   11th,	   a	   DOJ	   memorandum	  
responded	   to	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   diminishing	   the	   primary	  
purpose	  test	  would	  violate	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  with	  a	  resounding	  
no.100	  	  One	  month	  later,	  the	  Patriot	  Act	  was	  signed	  into	  law,	  and,	  with	  
the	  addition	  of	  two	  short	  words,	  completely	  changed	  the	  landscape	  of	  
foreign	   intelligence	   investigation,	   shattering	   what	   minimal	   Fourth	  
Amendment	   protections	   still	   remained	   in	   the	   area.	   The	   most	  
momentous	  consequence	  of	  the	  Patriot	  Act’s	  amendments	  to	  FISA	   is	  
likely	   the	   dilution	   of	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   purpose	   requirement	  
from	   “the	   purpose”	   to	   a	  merely	   “a	   significant	   purpose.”101	  With	   no	  
guidance	  regarding	  how	  significant	  this	  purpose	  needed	  to	  be,102	  the	  
DOJ	  quickly	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  formulate	  an	  interpretation	  that	  
would	  allow	  it	  to	  conduct	  foreign	  intelligence	  surveillance	  even	  where	  
criminal	  prosecution	  was	  a	  primary	  aim	  of	  the	  investigation.103	  
                                                
99	  See	  supra	  notes	  61	  and	  91.	  
100	  See	  Memorandum	  for	  David	  S.	  Kris,	  Associate	  Deputy	  Attorney	  Gen.,	  from	  John	  C.	  
Yoo,	  Deputy	  Assistant	  Attorney	  Gen.,	  Re:	  Constitutionality	  of	  Amending	  Foreign	  
Intelligence	  Surveillance	  Act	  to	  Change	  the	  "Purpose"	  Standard	  for	  Searches	  
(September	  25,	  2001),	  available	  at	  	  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memoforeignsurveillanceact09252001.pdf.	  
101	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1804(a)(6)(B)	  (2001).	  
102	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  ambiguity	  of	  the	  new	  purpose	  standard,	  see,	  e.g.,	  Hardin,	  
supra	  note	  60,	  at	  323	  (“In	  contrast	  to	  ‘primary,’…the	  term	  ‘significant’	  is	  void	  of	  any	  
preferential	  connotation	  that	  would	  accord	  a	  greater	  value	  to	  one	  purpose	  over	  
another…The	  difficulty	  in	  quantifying	  the	  term	  is	  apparent.”).	  
103	  See	  Brief	  for	  the	  United	  States	  at	  30-­‐56,	  In	  re	  Sealed	  Case,	  310	  F.3d	  717	  (Foreign	  
Intel.	  Surv.	  Ct.	  Rev.	  2002)	  (No.	  02-­‐001)	  (describing	  the	  DOJ’s	  interpretation	  of	  the	  
Patriot	  Act’s	  purpose	  requirement).	  See	  also	  Memorandum	  from	  John	  Ashcroft,	  
Attorney	  Gen.,	  Intelligence	  Sharing	  Procedures	  for	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  and	  Foreign	  
Counterintelligence	  Investigations	  Conducted	  by	  the	  FBI	  (Mar.	  6,	  2002)	  available	  at	  	  
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html	  (reworking	  the	  DOJ’s	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C. FISA	  Court	  of	  Review	  Convenes	  for	  the	  First	  Time	  
	  
	   Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   FISA	   established	   an	   appellate	   court	   to	  
review	   orders	   of	   FISC,	   the	   Foreign	   Intelligence	   Surveillance	   Court	   of	  
Review	   (hereinafter	   “FISCR”)	   did	   not	   convene	   a	   single	   time	   in	   the	  
twenty-­‐three	   years	   of	   its	   existence	   prior	   to	   the	   Patriot	   Act.104	   After	  
FISC	   hesitated	   to	   fully	   embrace	   the	  DOJ’s	   utter	   abandonment	   of	   the	  
primary	   purpose	   test	   and	   FISA	   walls	   and	   instead	   limited	   the	  
coordination	   sought	   by	   the	   FBI	   in	   a	   FISA	   warrant	   application	   by	  
requiring	   heightened	  minimization	   procedures,	   the	   government	   filed	  
the	  first	  ever	  appeal	  with	  FISCR.105	  	  Although	  no	  court	  or	  legislator	  by	  
2002	   could	   question	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	  
exception,	   the	   preconditions	   that	   a	   FISA	   warrant	   application	   must	  
meet	   in	   order	   to	   conform	   to	   Fourth	  Amendment	   requirements	  were	  
far	   from	   certain.106	   Just	   shy	   of	   the	   one-­‐year	   anniversary	   of	   the	  
September	  11th	  attacks,	  the	  DOJ	  gave	  FISCR	  the	  opportunity	  to	  clearly	  
prescribe	   these	   limitations.	   Nonetheless,	   FISCR	   frittered	   away	   yet	  
another	  occasion	  to	  define	  the	  boundaries	  of	  the	  excessive	  powers	  of	  
the	   executive	   branch	   to	   intrude	   into	   the	   private	   lives	   and	   homes	   of	  
people	  around	  the	  globe.	  
	   In	  re	  Sealed	  Case107	  was	  the	  last	  nail	  in	  the	  coffin	  of	  the	  primary	  
purpose	   test.	   FISCR’s	   holding	   that	   the	   Patriot	   Act	   eliminated	   the	  
primary	  purpose	   test	   chastised	   the	   circuit	   courts	   for	   their	   consistent	  
reliance	   upon	   it	   for	   the	   previous	   three	   decades.108	   In	   abruptly	  
reversing	   the	   course	   of	   nearly	   twenty-­‐five	   years	   of	   well-­‐established	  
                                                                                                                
minimization	  procedures	  to	  permit	  exchange	  of	  a	  “full	  range	  of	  information	  and	  
advice”	  between	  intelligence	  and	  law	  enforcement	  agents).	  
104	  See	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1803(b)(1978)	  (establishing	  a	  three-­‐judge	  court	  to	  review	  denials	  
of	  FISA	  warrant	  applications).	  See	  also	  Kornblum,	  supra	  note	  61,	  at	  643	  (discussing	  
FISCR’s	  failure	  to	  convene	  a	  single	  time	  before	  2002).	  
105	  See	  generally	  William	  C.	  Banks,	  And	  the	  Wall	  Came	  Tumbling	  Down:	  Secret	  
Surveillance	  After	  the	  Terror,	  57	  U.	  MIAMI	  L.	  REV.	  1147,	  1170	  (2003)	  (detailing	  the	  
events	  that	  led	  up	  to	  the	  first	  FISCR	  opinion	  in	  November	  2002).	  
106	  See,	  e.g.,	  the	  strikingly	  different	  arguments	  regarding	  the	  constitutionality	  of	  the	  
Patriot	  Act	  offered	  by	  the	  DOJ	  in	  its	  brief	  and	  the	  ACLU	  in	  its	  amici	  brief.	  See	  Brief	  for	  
the	  United	  States	  at	  30-­‐56,	  In	  re	  Sealed	  Case,	  310	  F.3d	  717	  (Foreign	  Intel.	  Surv.	  Ct.	  
Rev.	  2002)	  (No.	  02-­‐001);	  Brief	  for	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union	  as	  Amicus	  
Curiae	  at	  14-­‐23,	  In	  re	  Sealed	  Case,	  310	  F.3d	  717	  (Foreign	  Intel.	  Surv.	  Ct.	  Rev.	  2002)	  
(No.	  02-­‐001).	  
107	  In	  re	  Sealed	  Case,	  310	  F.3d	  717	  (Foreign	  Intel.	  Surv.	  Ct.	  Rev.	  2002).	  
108	  See	  Id.	  at	  726-­‐28.	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Circumventing	  the	  Constitution	  For	  National	  Security 237	  237	  
precedent,	   FISCR	   reasoned	   that	   the	   primary	   purpose	   test	   was	   not	  
mandated	  by	   either	   the	   language	  of	   FISA,	   especially	   as	   amended	  by	  
the	  Patriot	  Act,	  or	   the	  Constitution.109	   In	   light	  of	   the	  axe	   the	  Patriot	  
Act	   took	   to	   the	   primary	   purpose	   test	   by	   diminishing	   the	   purpose	  
requirement	  from	  “the”	  to	  “a	  significant,”	  this	  statutory	  interpretation	  
is	   not	   at	   all	   surprising.	   The	   contention	   that	   the	   Patriot	   Act’s	   new	  
purpose	  standard	  was,	  in	  fact,	  constitutionally	  sufficient	  is	  much	  more	  
shocking.	  To	  support	  this	  tenuous	  assertion,	  FISCR	  concluded	  that	  the	  
boundaries	   the	   courts	   sought	   to	   institute	   by	   creating	   the	   primary	  
purpose	   test	   were	   “inherently	   unstable,	   unrealistic,	   and	   confusing”	  
and	   “unstable	   because	   [they]	   generat[e]	   dangerous	   confusion	   and	  
creat[e]	  perverse	  organizational	  incentives.”110	  
	   While	  FISCR	  may	  have	  been	  correct	  in	  saying	  that	  the	  line	  between	  
a	  criminal	  and	  intelligence	  investigation	  is	  often	  murky	  and	  impossible	  
to	  clearly	  delineate,	  completely	  obliterating	  the	  only	  barrier	  between	  
limitless	   executive	   authority	   and	   the	   private	   liberty	   of	   citizens	   was	  
hardly	   the	  way	   to	   go	   about	   fixing	   this	   problem.	   FISCR’s	   holding	   that	  
the	  Patriot	  Act	  fit	  within	  the	  Court’s	  special	  needs	  exception	  because	  
“FISA’s	  general	  programmatic	  purpose,	   to	  protect	   the	  nation	  against	  
terrorists	  and	  espionage	  threats	  directed	  by	  foreign	  powers,	  has	  from	  
its	   outset	   been	   distinguishable	   from	   ‘ordinary	   crime	   control’”111	  
essentially	   removed	   the	   Constitution	   from	   consideration	   in	   cases	  
where	  foreign	  intelligence	  plays	  any	  role.	  In	  the	  post-­‐In	  re	  Sealed	  Case	  
world,	   there	   remains	   no	   guarantee	   at	   all	   that	   FISA	   and	   other	  
intelligence	   searches	   meet	   even	   the	   most	   minimal	   requirement	   of	  
reasonableness.	   	  
	  
D. The	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Exception	  Since	  the	  Patriot	  Act	  
	  
	   The	   utter	   disregard	   for	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   by	   the	   Patriot	  
Act	   and	   FISCR	   does	   not	   rest	   entirely	  with	   FISCR	   and	   the	   legislature.	  
The	  Court	  must	  also	  shoulder	  the	  blame	  for	   its	  failure	  to	  ensure	  that	  
the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  maintained	  an	  important	  place	  in	  intelligence	  
investigations.	  FISCR	  admitted	  that	  its	  decision	  treaded	  into	  unknown	  
waters,	   and	   that	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   was	   seemingly	  
                                                
109	  Id.	  	  
110	  Id.	  at	  743.	  
111	  Id.	  at	  746.	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incapable	   of	   strict	   regulation	   after	   so	   many	   years	   of	   unimpeded	  
growth.112	  All	  three	  branches	  of	  government	  have	  fallen	  short	  of	  their	  
constitutional	   obligations	   and	   have	   let	   national	   security	   completely	  
consume	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  
	   Since	   2002,	   forty-­‐seven	   cases	   have	   cited	   In	   re	   Sealed	   Case	   to	  
support	   the	   conclusion	   that	   warrantless	   foreign	   intelligence	  
surveillance	   does	   not	   offend	   the	   Constitution.113	   Only	   one	   case	  
criticized	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  President	  has	  the	  inherent	  authority	  
to	   conduct	   warrantless	   intelligence	   surveillance	   entirely	   outside	   the	  
bounds	   of	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment.114	   Combined	   with	   numerous	  
revelations	   that	   the	  Executive	  has	  consistently	  abused	   this	   “inherent	  
authority”	  and	  circumvented	  the	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  millions,115	  In	  
re	   Sealed	   Case	   serves	   to	   underscore	   the	   dire	   need	   to	   restore	   the	  













                                                
112	  See	  Id.	  (admitting	  that	  “the	  constitutional	  question	  presented	  by	  this	  case-­‐	  
whether	  Congress’s	  disapproval	  of	  the	  primary	  purpose	  test	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  
Fourth	  Amendment-­‐	  has	  no	  definitive	  jurisprudential	  answer.”).	  
113	  See	  Shepard’s	  Report,	  In	  re	  Sealed	  Case,	  310	  F.3d	  717	  (Foreign	  Intel.	  Surv.	  Ct.	  
Rev.	  2002).	  	  
114	  See	  Mayfield	  v.	  United	  States,	  504	  F.	  Supp.	  2d	  1023,	  1040-­‐1043	  (D.	  Or.	  2007),	  
vacated,	  599	  F.3d	  964	  (2010).	  
115	  See,	  e.g.,	  James	  Risen	  &	  Eric	  Lichtblau,	  Bush	  Lets	  U.S.	  Spy	  on	  Callers	  Without	  
Courts,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Dec.	  16,	  2005,	  
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all&_r
=0.	  See	  also	  supra	  note	  2	  (detailing	  Snowden’s	  leaks	  that	  describe	  the	  NSA’s	  massive	  
data	  collection	  program	  that	  clearly	  violated	  to	  prohibition	  of	  warrantless	  and	  
limitless	  domestic	  surveillance);	  supra	  note	  83(describing	  how	  the	  NSA’s	  data	  
collection	  programs	  violate	  the	  constitutional	  rights	  of	  Americans).	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VI. CONCLUSION	  	  
	  
The	  makers	  of	  our	  Constitution	  undertook	  to	  secure	  conditions	  favorable	  to	  the	  
pursuit	  of	  happiness.	  They	  recognized	  the	  significance	  of	  man's	  spiritual	  nature,	  of	  
his	  feelings	  and	  of	  his	  intellect.	  They	  knew	  that	  only	  a	  part	  of	  the	  pain,	  pleasure	  and	  
satisfactions	  of	  life	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  material	  things.	  They	  sought	  to	  protect	  
Americans	  in	  their	  beliefs,	  their	  thoughts,	  their	  emotions	  and	  their	  sensations.	  They	  
conferred,	  as	  against	  the	  Government,	  the	  right	  to	  be	  let	  alone	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  most	  
comprehensive	  of	  rights	  and	  the	  right	  most	  valued	  by	  civilized	  men.	  To	  protect	  that	  
right,	  every	  unjustifiable	  intrusion	  by	  the	  Government	  upon	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  
individual,	  whatever	  the	  means	  employed,	  must	  be	  deemed	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  Fourth	  
Amendment.116	  
-­‐	  Justice	  Brandeis,	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	  
	  
	   In	  a	  world	  where	  threats	  are	  evolving	  at	  a	  pace	  faster	  than	  the	  
Executive	   could	   ever	   keep	   up	   with,	   the	   justification	   of	   national	  
security	   protection	   is	   even	   more	   salient.	   It	   would	   be	   entirely	  
unreasonable	  to	  subject	  the	  government	  to	  the	  ordinary	  warrant	  and	  
probable	   cause	   requirements	   that	   govern	   more	   traditional	   criminal	  
investigation	   and	   crime	   prevention	   in	   cases	   implicating	   national	  
security	   concerns.	   However,	   the	   Fourth	   Amendment	   cannot	   be	  
entirely	   forgotten.	   In	   fighting	   for	   what	   they	   seek	   to	   protect,	   the	  
government	   should	   not	   at	   the	   same	   time	   destroy	   the	   values	   and	  
liberties	   on	   which	   the	   nation	   was	   built.	   As	   FISCR	   stated	   in	   a	   later	  
decision	  reviewing	  the	  now-­‐repealed	  Protect	  America	  Act,	  “in	  carrying	  
out	  its	  national	  security	  mission,	  the	  government	  must	  simultaneously	  
fulfill	   its	   constitutional	   responsibility	   to	   provide	   reasonable	  
protections	  for	  the	  privacy	  of	  United	  States	  persons.”117	  
	   Because	  the	  security	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  such	  a	  compelling	  interest,	  
the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception	  appears	  to	  be	  here	  to	  stay.	  Forcing	  
the	   government	   to	   pause	   a	   sensitive	   intelligence	   investigation	   to	  
attain	  judicial	  approval	  would	  certainly	  frustrate	  national	  security	  aims	  
in	  many	  instances.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  feasible	  to	  reverse	  the	  course	  of	  
history	  and	  stymie	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  foreign	  intelligence	  exception.	  
However	   compelling	   the	   justification	   of	   security	  may	   be,	   limitations	  
must	   be	   placed	   on	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   if	   the	   Fourth	  
Amendment	  is	  to	  continue	  to	  have	  any	  meaning.	  	  
                                                
116	  Olmstead	  v.	  United	  States,	  277	  U.S.	  438,	  478	  (1928)	  (Brandeis,	  J.,	  dissenting).	  
117	  In	  re	  Directives	  Pursuant	  to	  Section	  105b	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Intelligence	  Surveillance	  
Act,	  551	  F.3d	  1004,	  1016	  (Foreign	  Int.	  Surv.	  Ct.	  Rev.	  2008).	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   Like	  FISCR	  in	  In	  re	  Directives,	  significantly	  more	  focus	  should	  be	  
placed	   on	   oversight	   and	   minimization	   procedures.	   The	   executive	  
branch	  cannot	  be	  permitted	  to	  completely	  control	  foreign	  intelligence	  
surveillance.	  Just	  as	  the	  Fourth	  Amendment	   inserted	  a	  detached	  and	  
neutral	   magistrate	   to	   guard	   against	   overzealous	   law	   enforcement,	  
some	  protections	  must	  be	  put	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  overzealous	  
executive	  is	  not	  able	  to	  subjugate	  constitutional	  rights	  under	  the	  guise	  
of	  national	  security.	  	  
	   Eventually,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	  will	   be	   forced	   to	   step	   in.	   There	  
must	   be	   a	   coordinated	   effort	   amongst	   all	   three	   branches	   of	   the	  
government	  to	  zealously	  defend	  the	  Constitution	  by	  placing	  workable	  
restrictions	   on	   the	   foreign	   intelligence	   exception	   and	   demanding	  
accountability	  from	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  invoke	  it.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
